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SYNOPSIS
This study focusses on three distinct yet interrelated topics: 
the development and growth of the public agency as an administrative 
form, the methods whereby the activities of public agencies might be 
more fully integrated with the activities of Local Authorities through 
inter-corporate planning, and the changes necessary in planning 
education to effect a role re-definition in planning to enable planners 
to become equipped for the inter-corporate dimension.
In response to criticism of those theories of planning which fail 
to take into account the macro-societal context of planners' activities, 
Chapter One discusses the macro-sociological perspectives of both 
Marxist analysis (in two of its variant forms) and Corporatist thought 
in an attempt to explain the particular forms that state activity may 
take. However, a functionalist bias dominates these schools of thought 
and it is suggested that in order to explain more fully the growth of 
public agencies and the particular administrative form they may take, 
it is necessary to develop more specific micro-theories of agency 
growth and a critical appraisal of these is developed in Chapter Two. 
After a further critical appraisal of attempts at taxonomy and classifi­
cation of public agencies which ultimately proves somewhat unproductive, 
this discussion is concluded by suggesting that, although government 
agencies differ in a number of ways in their relationship with both 
Central Government and other organisations, they can be reduced to one 
common denominator, that is the fact that they are all organisations.
This perspective is used to widen the conventionally held assumptions 
about agency accountability into the much more realistic view of agency 
discretion (a point which it is suggested could be much further developed
by future research). After suggesting a tentative classification 
scheme as a guide for Local Authorities, this is used as a surrogate 
measure to estimate the numbers of such bodies likely to interact 
most frequently with Local Authorities although, as is emphasised in 
the text, these numbers are closer to 'guestimates' due to the inade­
quacies of conventional definitions*
Chapter Three, after a brief discussion of the inadequacies of 
conventional views of central-local relations, illustrates the conse- 
quneces of agency interaction in situations where inter-corporate co­
ordination has been poor. In an attempt to look more deeply at the 
methods of co-ordination suggested by the few authors who have considered 
it, it is argued that one needs to discuss inter-agency interaction 
from the perspective of inter-organisational analysis in order to fully 
understand the way in which government agencies interact in a dynamic 
setting. Given that this literature is diffuse, the subject is 
approached through a consideration of the work of three authors in 
order to highlight the most significant points. Management techniques 
and Organisational Design are introduced in the last sections of this 
chapter.
The concepts and ideas introduced in Chapter Three are more fully 
applied in analysing multiple-organisation situations in the public 
sector in Chapter Four. After focussing briefly on corporate planning 
and management in order to characterise the orthodox views of public 
sector management and its weakness when applied inter-corporately 
three case examples, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme, the 
Passenger Transport Executives and the Scottish Regional Reports, are 
critically appraised in terms of their original organisational design
and the results that they were intended to achieve. Consideration of 
these examples serves to demonstrate the inherent conservatism in 
the respect of organisational autonomy in what were intended to be 
fully comprehensive attempts at 'planning', and specific suggestions 
for improvements are included.
Having emphasised that the realities of public policy-making 
are inter-corporate, the final concluding chapter looks at how a role 
re-definition of planning may be effected through changes in planning 
education in order to bring some order again to urban change.
It is suggested that planners have developed intra-corporate techniques 
which could be usefully developed for the management of inter-corporate 
situations, although, as is pointed out, the 'urban management' debate 
has been unnecessarily stigmatised through the writings of Pahl.
Having shown that Pahl's concerns were in fact very much narrower than 
the concerns of this study, concern is shifted to looking at how inter- 
organisational analysis can be included in planning education. Using 
the work of Faludi as a basis for the consideration of the role of 
theory in planning education, criticism is directed at his procedural/ 
substantive distinction as a basis for the incorporation of inter- 
organisational analysis into planning education. The study concludes 
with suggestions for integration of inter-organisational sociology into 
planning schools' curricula and ends with the exhortation for a 
professional role re-definition on the basis of a changing view of the 
public sector.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with raising issues for examination and 
discussion on the roles of organisations loosely referred to as 'fringe 
bodies' or 'quangos', a term which, as Hogwood (1979) has pointed out, 
must be one of the fastest spreading academic neologisms ever.
However, for reasons related to attempts at classification outlined 
later, the terms 'government agencies’ or 'public agencies' are pre­
ferred in this work. These terms are taken to cover organisations 
other than central and local government departments (and the judiciary 
and armed forces) which carry out functions on behalf of government.
This definition, although fairly broad, has the advantages of according 
with common sense distinction and of avoiding the traps of definition 
in terms of concepts which cannot be operationalised or in terms of 
characteristics (which, as will be seen below, is somewhat unproductive). 
It must be stated at the outset that this is merely a 'working definition' 
which has some disadvantages. Firstly, by defining in terms of 
'not-departments' it begs the question of what counts as a government 
department. As Hood, Dunsire and Thompson (1978) have suggested 
recently, the distinction between what is and what is not a government 
department is somewhat unclear.
Secondly, at central and local government level there is also a 
problem of drawing a boundary round department^ for example, one might 
wish to question whether individual institutions such as schools or 
libraries, physically and indeed socially distinct from the relevant 
department, is a part of that department. However, the inter- 
organisational framework outlined later is capable of extension to the 
institution-headquarters dimension.
Thirdly, the working definition adopted here is open-ended in terms 
of the boundaries between government agencies and purely private 
organisations. This is a problem which pervades the literature on 
classification and in the short term seems unresolvable.
Certainly the term 'public agency’ seems preferable to the civil 
service term 'fringe body' as used by Bowen (1978) in the Civil Service 
Department report of that name. As Bowen himself remarks, the term 
'fringe body' carries the connotation that it is in some way of peripheral 
importance to government, an inaccurate description when one considers 
the numbers of such bodies.
Definitional problems notwithstanding, the study (as can be seen 
from the synopsis) focusses on three broad areas, public agencies as 
an administrative form, theories of their interaction and co-ordination 
and the implications of these for the professional view of planning.
The subject itself was chosen as there has been a surprising lack of 
consideration of public agencies and their interactions with local 
authorities beyond the level of case study (for example, the new 
series of articles in The Planner on the relations between development 
agencies and local authority planning departments takes the case study 
approach (see Stanley (1979))* However, at the outset, it is important 
to make three general points about the form and content of the study.
- Firstly, the criticism often levelled at conventional planning 
theories is that they fail to take into account societal development 
and indeed neglect the overall role of the state in contemporary society.
As Frost (1977) argues,
'••• planning agencies exist in particular societies 
and such societies have definable social, economic 
and political characteristics. It could, therefore, 
be argued that by seeking to improve planning agencies, 
one wishes either to reinforce or to change the 
characteristics of society.1
(p.220)
Thus Chapter One by focussing explicitly on the macro-theoretical level 
of analysis, is a conscious attempt to counter criticisms such as those 
of Frost. However, as will be seen from this chapter, such macro 
perspectives with their almost functionalist biases, fail to fully 
explain the agency as a particular administrative form and indeed seem 
somewhat reluctant to discuss the form of the state at all.
Secondly, given the somewhat turbulent political environment that 
exists at present with the general election imminent, the effects of 
devolution for government agencies in Scotland will not be discussed 
in this study. However, if the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 
or any other form of legislative devolution were to be implemented, 
it may be useful at this point to make a number of general observations 
on the possible effects of devolution for public agencies.
The first point to make is that devolution would constitute an 
important change in the operating environment of all government agencies, 
whether or not responsibility for some or all of their functions were 
formally devolved. Public policy outputs from an organisation often 
require clearance from other public organisations, so the operating 
environment of an organisation will be affected by the extent to which 
related or overlapping functions of other bodies are devolved or 
otherwise affected by devolution. In addition, the establishment of a
Scottish Assembly would result in a more politicised environment for 
all public bodies, whether or not they are devolved.
Secondly, following devolution, the picture would be far from a 
simple one of organisations located in Scotland dealing with Scottish 
functions and reporting to the Scottish Executive, and organisations 
based in London dealing with British functions and reporting to White­
hall. Some Scottish agencies would remain with the Scottish Office 
and London-based departments, while responsibility for some functions 
currently carried out by British-wide bodies would be devolved.
Thirdly, the transition to devolution would be about a move to 
new types of relationships involving substantial changes from the past, 
thus the assumption that relations operate within generally accepted 
'rules of the game' as in current central-local relations, does not 
hold in the same way. Both the 'rules' and the 'game' might change.
Finally, the addition of new Scottish Assembly departments, and 
of any new government agencies established by the Scottish Assembly 
(even allowing for some offsetting reductions), will increase very 
substantially the already complex multilateral pattern of links involvirg 
public agencies, because of the increased number of links.
Thirdly, the focus in this study on inter-corporate management 
techniques is somewhat limited at the personal level. Although 
strategies whereby organisations manage their dependencies on other 
organisations are considered, the only individual management role 
considered is that of the 'reticulist'. As will be seen later, this 
concept has its limitations in practice and a much fuller study should
be directed towards developing management techniques at the individual 
level. Although it is outside the scope of this study to analyse 
private sector management techniques and their applicability to the 
public sector, a much longer study should attempt to develop these 
for the public sector whilst bearing in mind that their focus is much 
more limited.
To summarise completely the character of this dissertation would
be impossible. However, one might usefully paraphrase Sweezy's (1946)
introduction to 'The theory of Capitalist Development' and suggest,
'There exists no reasonably comprehensive analytical 
study of government agencies and their management 
in multiple organisation situations. This study 
is not intended to fill this gap. It is intended 
merely as a signpost with which to guide both 
future research and practice.'
CHAPTER 1 - SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF STATE 
FORM AND FUNCTION
In a strict sense, there has never been such a thing as a 'laissez- 
faire' capitalist economy. The history of state intervention in the 
private industrial and commercial sector is not only a recent phenomenon: 
it is intimately linked to the development of the capitalist economy 
itself. Although this is obviously not the place to chart this history 
in detail, it should be noted that there is a clearly discernible trend 
to the greater interlocking of private interests and the state, from the 
first Factory and Companies Acts through the close relation between 
state and private industry in the inter-war period of crisis to the legis­
lation on monopolies and restrictive practices of the post-war period. 
Moreover, discussions of this trend have not been confined to the 
Marxist writers of what Radice (1978) terms the 'classic age of imperialism' 
Kautsky, Hilferding. Lenin and Bukharin:- similar discussions can be 
found in the work of the more institutionally minded non-Marxists such as 
Weber, Veblen, Hobson, Schumpeter and the British Fabians. Thus Crosland 
(1952), writing in the context of the application of Keynesian demand- 
management techniques by British Government and drawing upon the theories 
of Bell, Burnham and Galbraith, suggested that capitalism had changed its 
nature and that its abolition was no longer necessary for the achievement 
of socialist objectives. Capitalism in Crosland's view had been replaced 
by 'Statism', a change which represented a major social revolution.
'With its arrival, the most characteristic features of 
capitalism have all disappeared: the absolute rule of
private property, the subjection of the whole of economic 
life to market prices, the domination of the profit motive, 
the neutrality of government, the typical laissez-faire 
division of income and the ideology of individual rights.
This is no minor modification: it is a major historical
change.'
(Crosland, 1952, p.45)
Crosland's revisionist analysis of the overall management of the 
mixed economy was echoed by Shonfield (1965) almost fifteen years later.
When surveying the relatively affluent Western Liberal Democracies with 
their various degrees of welfare provision and their developing indicative 
planning systems linking and co-ordinating public and private in an informal 
manner, Shonfield was struck by the contrast with the depressed capitalist 
world of the previous generation. This contrast led Shonfield to 
suggest that,
'the economic order under which we now live, and the social 
structure that goes with it, are so different from what
preceded them, that it is misleading ....  to use the word
'capitalism' to describe them.'
(Shonfield, 1965> p.163) 
Shonfield consequently opted for the label 'modern capitalism' since the 
elements of continuity seemed greater than the changes.
Radice (1978) suggests that such analyses in the post-war period of 
capitalist 'renaissance' allowed the 'problem' of the state to be largely 
ignored. Analysts in an age of pragmatism could simply accept that the 
state customarily undertook a certain range of activities in particular 
forms without bothering to consider precisely why, or indeed what the 
state really was. Similar criticisms can be made of Marxist thought.
It must be stated at the outset that the Marxist tradition has a totally 
different perspective on the state than that of orthodox political 
economy; its fundamental tenet is precisely that it is a capitalist state, 
a class state, and not a neutral arbiter between interests howsoever 
divided. But until recently, Marxism had little more to say than precisely 
that. The predominant view was that the state was both the instrument and 
reflection of capital and that its activities and its apparatus were designed 
to serve capitalist interests. Hence Keynesianism, for example, enshrining 
state intervention at the 'macro-economic' level was the last resort of 
capitalism in crisis: monopoly capitalism became state monopoly capitalism.
However, with the gradual disintegration of the post-war boom, the inter­
national monetary system and the hegemony of Keynesianism in orthodox
economics, with all the profound changes in economic and socialUfe 
since 1965 > it is hardly surprising that the whole question of the role and 
nature of the state in society has come up for redefinition. Of 
particular interest is the French Marxist School whose attention, following 
the events of 1968 in France, has been on Urban Analysis and the role 
and form of the state in the Urban context. Given the focus of the 
present study on the forms and management of state institutions, the 
intention is thus to examine, albeit in a limited way, a number of the 
complex issues and questions posed by these writers for the study of 
urban planning and state intervention.
As Pahl (1977) points out, marxist analysts of the urban question in 
capitalist societies analyse the role of the state by fitting it into a 
theory of the development of the capitalist mode of production. However, 
within this shared overall perspective there are distinct differences of 
emphasis on the role and autonomy of the state. Fbulantzas (1975) in 
’Classes in Contemporary Capitalism' has argued that the pre-eminent role 
of the state in capitalism is that of maintaining the unity and cohesion 
of society and reproducing its class structure. Its fundamental effect 
is to resolve political conflict by organising dominant interests and 
enforcing bourgeios control. Intervention by the state through urban 
planning and the provision of public goods and services, is also recognised 
as being undertaken to counteract the falling rate of profit.
Poulantzas stresses that the state apparatus, the bureaucracy, 
itself has no power, that is, it is not an 'entity' as such but 'reflects* 
class relations. It is, moreover, not a simple tool or instrument to be
manipulated by a 'single coherent will'. Instead, the state is thought of 
as a 'relation, more precisely the condensation of a class relation' (p.26) 
and thus expresses the balance of political forces in society at any given 
time.
Similar themes are discussed by Castells (perhaps the best known 
writer of the French Urban Marxist School). His view of the state's 
role is presented in various writings but is made particularly explicit in 
a paper published in 1975* There Castells asserts that state inter­
vention is necessary, firstly, to deal with services and sectors of the 
economy that are not profitable but nonetheless necessary for capitalist 
accumulation, and secondly, for the appeasement of social protests.
Both aspects are displayed in the increasing scale of state involvement in 
the provision of 'collective consumption' and especially in urban facilities 
(roads, public transport, public housing, control of land use, urban 
renewal, infrastructure). Such intervention is understood as being
'functional and necessary ....  even though it is often done in opposition
to some capitalist interests' (p.178), and as being integral to the 
reproduction of labour power. Urban planning is thus simultaneously a 
regulatory function and a political response to class conflict. Castells 
emphasises that though the state intervenes, 'it acts in the interests of 
the ensemble of the capitalist system and not only as a servant for a given 
group' (pp.180-l); the state thus does have a relative autonomy even 
though it tends to express ruling class interests.
Thus the Structuralist marxist perspectives of Poulantzas and Castells, 
in summary, see the state as the 'condensate' of political class relations, 
necessarily functioning in the long term interests of monopoly capital 
(since this is the dominant political force) while reacting in the short 
term to the power of other classes. State intervention on behalf of
subordinate classes is thus always limited to reformism:- to reproducing 
the system, since its role in the social formation is structurally 
determined by the class relationship (which is itself determined by the 
economic).
Such Structuralist approaches can be contrasted with Instrumentalist 
marxist perspectives which suggest that the state functions in the interests 
of the dominant economic class (capital as a whole or fractions of capital) 
because of the power which this class enjoys in relation to the state.
Thus Lojkine (1977), for example, sees the state as an instrument of mono­
poly capitalist interests and attempts to explain its 'relative autonomy' 
from these interests by arguing either that the state may ac.t against the 
immediate demands of this class where it anticipates trouble from subordinate 
classes, or, that subordinate classes can sometimes wrest control of the 
state from monopoly capital (for example, through Communist victories in 
municipal elections in France). Lojkine further claims that the relative 
autonomy of the state is revealed particularly in cases of Urban planning 
and policy which are clearly political concessions to Working Class 
pressure (for example, extensions to public transport and 'social' urban 
renewal schemes) and also in 'political tendencies' which bear no obvious 
relation to either capitalist interests or working class demands.
The weakness of the Instrumentalist theory (apart from the obvious 
tendency towards reification) is that it fails to explain adequately those 
cases where state outputs are non-class specific or even specific to the 
interests of the working class. As can be seen in L.ojkine's work above, 
his first 'anticipation' argument rests on an assumption of ruling class 
foresight which appears historically dubious, whilst his second argument
seems to take the analysis outside a marxian framework altogether and to 
leave few grounds for arguing that the state in capitalist society is 
inherently a capitalist state.
The Structuralist position on the other hand has no trouble in explaining 
those situations where the state appears to act against the interests of 
the dominant class. The problem however is that it can ostensibly account 
for anything the state does for it contains no contrafactual statement.
When Pickvance (1976, p.204) suggests that 'The role of authorities in
initiating changes is an empirical question', he may be right, but Structura­
list theory does not admit of such investigation. Rather, as Saunders 
(1978) observes, when the state acts in the interests of monopoly capital, 
this is because that is the dominant class; when it does not, it is because 
it is relatively autonomous from that class. The theory is tautologous 
based upon a priori reasoning (which is justified by a claim to 'science* 
with reference to Althusserian epistemology:- see Pickvance (1976) for a 
fuller discussion of this point).
Secondly, the Structuralist perspective falls foul of the traditional 
functionalist problem of teleology. The causes of state policies are seen
to lie in the balance of political class forces, yet it is nowhere explained
how this necessarily leads to the function of such policies in reproducing 
the system. Indeed, Castells (1977) refers to the 'aims' or 'intentions* 
of the state in an attempt to resolve this problem. However, as Saunders 
suggests, this contradicts the central argument that the state is not a thing 
but a relation. Gold et al (1975) succinctly conclude that this approach 
therefore, fails to 'explain the social mechanisms which actually generate 
a class policy that is compatible with the needs of the system', (p.36).
Flynn (1978) suggests that what both Structural and Instrumental
theories of the state have in common is that their concept of the state is
a reified and simplistic one; the 'state1 appears to be homogeneous,
all-embracing, integrated and rational. The terms used by Poulantzas
in particular lead to an image of the state which is so highly abstract
that Hirst (1977) argues,
'Poulantzas' conception of the *political' and of 'class power' creates 
the problem that the political 'instance' is everywhere and nowhere. 
The specificity of the state apparatus is discounted. The 'state' 
cannot be defined at the level of institutions or apparatuses 
(they are merely forms of manifestation of class power) but can 
be defined only by its position......' (p.152).
As Hirst points out the state exists, it has specific institutional forms,
conditions of existence and limitations on its activities. Flynn adds
that these features of the state often seem to be at best regarded as
peripheral and at worst neglected in the Marxist writings discussed
briefly and somewhat incompletely above. Most of the studies dismiss
research which is based on an institutional level of analysis (although
Castells, to his credit, has attempted to apply his framework in a case
study of Dunkirk) because it tends to explain decision and power in
policy-making in terms of organisational dynamics and individual motives
instead of understanding them as products of class relations and class
power. Given the Althusserian a priori reasoning discussed above, the
premise is that all state actions, including local government action are
theoretically pre-defined as being in the long term interest of capitalist
production relations and so must be analysed accordingly. However, this
is far from being helpful in operational terms when one confronts the
political or bureaucratic complexity of 'the state' at both national and
local levels.
Considering very briefly some of the main characteristics of British 
local government, it is evident that various factors complicate a
narrowly-based class analysis. Intra-organisationally, the resources of 
the 'local state' are not unlimited; it operates within the constraints 
of central government policy and financial control, it is highly 
bureaucratised, organisationally complex, staffed by large numbers of 
professionals and semi-professionals, and subject to the changing political 
pressures and public demands of local and national society. Clearly, 
'managerialist' considerations such as the balance of bureaucratic power, 
the influence of different professionals and Chief Offices, the status of 
committees and departments, the degree of corporate integration in 
management teams are all potentially important variables affecting the 
selection of issues for council action or non-action, options debated, 
'technical' recommendations considered by councillors, and the nature of 
actions undertaken.
Inter-organisationally, it can be argued that 'inter-tier conflicts' 
can be explained in terms which are not necessarily contained within a 
class analysis which stresses contradictions between different fractions 
of capital and segments of the state apparatus. Pritchard (1978) for 
instance, highlights the intense argument about the dual planning structure 
in which 'strategic' and 'local' functions are divided between Counties or 
Regions and Districts. Similarly, it is evident that local authorities 
in providing urban facilities and services, are increasingly constrained 
organisationally because resource allocation and policy implementation are 
accomplished through a multiplicity of different public agencies. As 
this is the prime concern of this study, it is obviously discussed in much 
greater detail in succeeding chapters. At this point, however, it is 
crucial to state that whatever a council's political commitment and 
programme may be, its capacity to realise its aims will often be limited 
by the fact that the instruments for action reside in other external bodies.
Thus, for example, physical infrastructure like water supply and sewerage 
(in England and Wales) and gas and electricity (throughout the United 
Kingdom) are dealt with by very large statutory organisations or nationalised 
industries whose terms of reference, planning, budgeting and management 
systems as well as their operational working render them quite independent 
of local government and at times only distantly related to central 
government. The Regional Water Authorities in England and Wales are 
critical agencies insofar as their Medium Term Plans and Capital Works 
Programmes determine the feasibility of larger scale industrial and 
residential development. Yet explanations of both the ’relative autonomy1 
of such bodies and their inter-relationships with other organs of central 
and local government are immensely complicated issues which seem to require 
a degree of theoretical specification which is not yet apparent marxist 
writings.
There is, however, another macro-theoretical account of modern society 
which takes such inter-organisational relations as a major theme and indeed 
purports also to be able to explain the growth of agencies in the macro 
context. This is the Corporatist literature as expounded by Pahl and 
Winkler (1974) and Winkler (1976, 1977). These authors, drawing on and 
developing the work of Bell, Burnham, Galbraith and Shonfield amongst 
others, suggest that Britain in particular is developing a corporatist 
economic system. (Society is seen as consisting of diverse elements unified 
into one body, forming one ’corpus1).
The 'essence' of corporatism is concisely defined by Caw.Son (l977)»
'Corporatism is a political system in which the state 
directs the activities of predominantly privately owned 
industry in partnership with the representatives of a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
interest groups.' (p.4)
However, within this definition, certain points may be usefully high­
lighted. Firstly, Corporatism involves a fundamental qualitative shift 
in the state's role from being supportive to being directive: the state
directs and controls predominantly privately owned business by prescribing 
or limiting the range of choice open to capitalist owners, that is, the 
state is involved in the internal decision making of companies. The 
Planning Agreements system introduced by the Labour Government in 1975 
illustrates the principle admirably although the system has been much diluted 
from both its original intellectual and legislative conception. As 
originally conceived, planning agreements were to be periodic undertakings 
between major companies and Government covering prices, investment, pro­
ductivity (including both choice of technology and employment levels), 
exports, import savjag, industrial relations, product development, consumer 
protection and environmental protection. In short, a comprehensive set of 
targets governing all major aspects of corporate activity. However, the 
corporatist thesis seems seriously weakened by there having been only two of 
these agreements signed, one with British Leyland and the other with Chrysler 
and extraneous factors are arguably more important in these circumstances.
Corporatist thought, as Pahl and Winkler highlight, is not only confined 
to Labour Governments. The post-Sals den phase of the Heath Government from 
1972-1974 turned to increasingly Corporatist solutions as is evident in 
statements by Peter Walker in 1974 who advocated a 'new kind of interventionism' 
suggesting that 'in the coming quarter of a century, the role of government 
in capitalist economies must go wider still' (quoted by Pahl and Winkler, 
p.74). Similarly, if the corporatist thesis is correct, the policies
of a Thatcher led Conservative government would begin to backtrack 
on neo-liberalism soon after they assumed office.
Cawson notes that the Corporatist trend towards a combination of 
private ownership and public control is equally visible in town planning, 
with, perhaps, the decisive shift from a supportive to a directive role for 
the state contained in the Community Land Act of 1975* In abstract terms 
this change would be a permanent shift from the state telling private 
landowners what they cannot do with their land towards the state defining 
in 'the public interest1 what landowners must do with their land.
Secondly, this fundamental expansion of the state's role is not 
resisted by private capital indeed, paradoxically, it is welcomed. Cawson 
goes as far as to suggest that the evolution of capitalism from a market 
economy guaranteed by the liberal state, through liberal democracy and the 
welfare state, to a corporate economy regulated by a corporate state is 
determined by the dynamics of the combination of market allocation and 
private ownership, which can be taken as the defining characteristics of 
capitalism. Industrial concentration produces private firms which indi­
vidually or in collusion, seek to regulate competition to secure stability 
and growth even at the expense of profit maximisation. An increasing 
degree of control over market conditions takes the form of forward planning, 
vertical integration or horizontal conglomeration (see Galbraith (1967) 
for a fuller discussion of this point). In order for the planning function 
to be successful in the private sector, corporate business increasingly 
seeks government intervention to help stabilise the business cycle and 
make the future less uncertain. Thus one of the most important indicators 
of the Corporatist trend is held to be the acceptance by liberal-democratic 
regimes of the state function of indicative planning, although in Britain, 
the acceptance of the principle that with respect to land, market 
allocation can be contrary to the public interest predated state economic
planning by nearly 50 years.
Thirdly, given such an industrial structure, the state can broadly 
shape aggregate performance by controlling only the oligopolies. This has 
the administratively very economical and apparently liberal consequence of 
leaving the great mass of small firms free from formal regulation. More 
importantly, for dealing with the limited number of dominant firms a massive 
administrative apparatus is unnecessary. Agreements may be worked out in 
private negotiations between key individuals in the state and business 
sectors. Similarly the principle of strategic control also applies in 
incomes policy. The state tries to regulate wages by making agreements 
with the principal unions, feeling that it can leave unorganized workers 
unregulated because whatever their wage movements they will not significantly 
affect aggregate rates. Thus, in the Corporatist view, the state uses 
private organisations, essentially 'functional interest groups' to administer 
its policies. Once the state reaches 'voluntary' agreements with a few 
large or representative private organisations, it then obliges them to 
enforce these bargains themselves to control their own members, associates, 
clients or supplies.
The contemporary term for this 'self-enforcement' is 'participation'. 
Winkler (1977) suggests that in many realms (industrial democracy, regional 
devolution and community action) 'participation' provides the legitimation 
for co-opting potential dissidents into apparent constitutions of decision­
making, for defusing opposition, and, if successful, for turning them into 
agents for implementing state policy. He adds that if one takes the
ideology at face value, what appears to be happening is a formalisation 
of interest group politics:- an institutionalisation of pluralism.
However, as C.ockburn (1977) has highlighted, within co-optive institutions
the state will still have to bargain and make compromises. Caw.son (1977) 
extends the argument into the planning field and suggests that 'corporate* 
participation has replaced 'public' participation in the process of plan 
formulation. Further, he argues that the Sheffington recommendations on 
the appointment of community development offices are in effect, formalised 
procedures for representing unincorporated interests corporately in the 
planning process.
Arguments such as these raise the final and most significant point in
Corporatist theory, the question of the definition of 'the state'.
Winkler (1977) in discussing this point translates the question of 'what
is the state' into another concerned solely with 'what does the state do'
and the resulting definition is functionalist.
'The state, in Corporatist theory, is merely the administrative 
institutions of the corporate body, the nation. It exists 
simply to articulate and execute the common interest in the 
form of collective national goals and policies. In the 
corporatist vision, the state is neither separate from nor 
superior to the; people, the state is the people organised.' (p.49)
This definition begs the whole question about the locus of power within
the government itself which is precisely the issue with which the theory of
corporatism is concerned. However, Winkler (1977) does attempt to relate
the 'tendencies' of a corporatist state to take particular institutional
forms. He asserts that, as state intervention shifts increasingly from
facilitative and supportive functions to a directive role, it will
increasingly resort to antinomianism, inquisitorial justice, extra-legal
power, strategic rather than universal control of private industry, the use
of semi-autonomous agencies to enforce and promote government policies,
and the use of private, non-governmental organisations for the same reason.
Thus corporatism is associated with a shift in the forms as well as the
nature of state intervention and not just with a quantitative increase 
therein.
In adopting this perspective, however, Winkler (1977) effectively 
separates the 'state1 as a set of institutions from the 'people' as a 
group, which is precluded by his definition above. Hence corporatist theory 
oscillates between treating the state system blithely in crude terms as a 
mere agent of a functionally organised population or as a totally autonomous 
body towards which the accumulation of corporate power becomes trans­
substantiated into dirigiste norms.
Pahl and Winkler's ideal typical notion of corporatism can be 
replaced by Jessop's (1978) notion of 'tripartism'. Tripartism is a 
hybrid form of state in which corporatist and parliamentary forms of state 
are combined into a contradictory unity owing to the participation in 
corporatist decision-making of representatives of the parliamentary executive 
(or government) and the participation in parliamentary decision-making and 
administration of corporations (for example, unions and employers’ 
associations).
This model has the advantage of rejecting both simplistic class 
influence and system constraint models of the state and avoids explaining 
state policy and institutional form as being externally determined. Thus 
to fully explain policy outcomes one needs to focus on the internal 
structure of the state and to explain or account for the growth of public 
agencies as an administrative form, one needs to take a more micro view.
The next chapter is devoted to a consideration and analysis of 
theories of agency growth and form, whilst chapter three uses inter- 
organisational analysis to look at the consequences of their interaction 
for policy making and tentatively suggests some techniques which may be used 
to co-ordinate the different elements of an increasingly diverse 'state' form.
CHAPTER 2 - THE PUBLIC AGENCY AS AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE FORM
It is clear from the above discussion that the tendency of the 'state' 
adopt a particular administrative form is touched on, although dealt with 
somewhat inadequately, by macro-theoretical perspectives such as Marxism 
and Corporatism. Writers in these schools of thought tend to view ad­
ministrative form as largely functionally determined by the activities 
of the state, relating it to class structure and conflict or the diri- 
gism of a corporatist state. Such functionalist explanations seem some­
what limited when one considers the diversity of institutional forms that 
the modern state apparatus now exists in. As early as 1936, Jennings 
had noted that,
'The simple dichotomy of central departments responsible to 
Parliament through ministers and local authorities responsible 
to a local electorate no longer exists. The twenty-four 
ministers are not leaders of columns which march behind them 
in regular ranks for the columns now have outsiders in their 
flanks and a relatively unorganised mass of camp followers 
trailing behind.'
(p.80)
Mackenzie and Grove's 1957 work on central departments also highlighted 
the presence of these administrative 'outsiders and camp followers'.
Their research revealed that British central government, far from being 
'centralised and unitary' as the conventional wisdom held, was in fact 
surrounded by a diverse semi-public, semi-independent sector difficult to 
both classify and explain. This 'fringe' they broadly characterised as 
organisations that act under the general direction of government and 
are provided with public funds, but are at 'arm's length' from Whitehall 
departments and exercise a degree of independence in their day to day 
actions. Far from disappearing in subsequent periods of governmental
rationalisation and re-organisation, such 'fringe bodies' or governmental 
agencies have been a major governmental growth sector following what Keeling 
(1976) terms 'the organisational equivalent of the theory of continuous 
creation of matter'.
Bowen (1978) suggests that governmental agencies have always been 
an administrative feature of British Government although their designation 
has changed through the years. Indeed Hanson and Walles (l970) attribute 
a somewhat distinguished pedigree to such bodies suggesting that there was 
a comparable spreading of 'irregular' administrative, judicial and quasi­
judicial institutions during two previous historical periods:- the Tudor 
period and that of the Industrial Revolution in the early nineteenth century 
when agencies first became a notable feature of government. In this 
period, the growth of agencies occurred when the functions of government 
widened in response to the rapid social and economic changes of the times. 
Interestingly, a parallel government expansion through the use of boards 
and commissions to carry out particular functions and not through the ex­
tension of the role or functions of existing departments occurred in the 
United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
As Parris (1969) has highlighted, at this time in Britain, central 
government functions moved back from boards and commissions and became 
consolidated again in Central Departments. Thus, by the time that the 
Haldane Committee was examining the 'machinery of government' in 1918, 
most functions had become the responsibility of central departments again 
and government agencies had virtually disappeared (with the exception of 
standing Royal Commissions). Despite Haldane's suspicion of what he 
termed 'Administrative Boards' and his recommendation that the normal 
form of central administrative body should be the government department,
his views did little to stem the growth of such bodies in the twentieth 
century. A spate of such bodies was set up in the 1920s (including such 
notables as the BBC, Central Electricity Generating Board and the London 
Passenger Transport Board). By the late 1930s after the creation of bodies 
such as the agricultural marketing boards, fishery support bodies and public 
corporations (for example BOAC), prototypes existed for most of the agencies 
which were set up after World War Two - including what Hague et al (1975) 
term the 'old-fashioned nationalisation1formulae of the 1940s and the 
accompanying mass of advisory, promotional trade levy and specialised 
banking organisations.
Many of the agencies which have most input into the activities of 
Local Authority Planning Departments due to either their function or their 
land-use requirements have birth-dates in this early post-war period. The 
Countryside Commission, the New Town Development Corporations and British 
Rail are amongst the earliest, but there has been a continuing willingness 
to use this form of administration until the present day with the Forestry 
Commission, the Highlands and Islands Development Board, the Scottish 
and Welsh Development Agencies and the 1974 'water industry' reorganisation 
in England and Wales being the best known examples of this in recent times.
Clearly from this 'reputational' survey, the existence of these bodies 
presents a number of problems for the analyst of governmental form to 
explain. Firstly, one needs to examine the reasons for the growth of such 
bodies. Secondly, some attention must be given to refining definition 
and classification before one turns finally to consider the numbers of such 
bodies. As most of the work on explanations of agency growth has been 
developed by Hood (1973, 1978) it is to a brief critical appraisal of 
his work that attention is now turned.
At the outset, Hood (1978) suggests that there are four possible ways 
in which one might explain why agencies are instituted in various forms 
and he argues, if this problem can be explained, the reason for the general 
growth of the agency as an administrative form should be revealed.
However, his four possible explanations, 'Roulette Wheel', 'Fashion', 
'Managerial Technology' and 'Political' tend to oscillate between general 
and specific levels and one is never quite certain which level he is 
arguing at (a point exacerbated by him not defining what he means by 
agency 'form' at any point in the paper)*
The 'Roulette Wheel' theory is directed at the specific level and 
acts as a 'null hypothesis' suggesting that the pattern of agency growth is 
random in the sense that the factors governing agency type are so compli­
cated that it is impossible to predict agency form from any general body 
of theory. Explanations of form would have to be directly researched 
from a microscopic knowledge of the administrative history of the area and 
the personalities involved. As can be seen from the above discussion, at 
the general level there has been a clear trend to the use of the agency as 
an administrative form by government, although this of course does not 
preclude the 'roulette wheel' theory being the 'explanation' of different 
agency types of the specific level.
In contrast, the 'fashion theory' focusses very much on the general 
level seeking to explain agency growth and forms deductively from changing 
administrative fashion. Illustrative of this approach is the work of 
Wettenhall (1968) who suggests that there are 'long swings' in opinion 
in public administration between moods of integration (seeing the public
sector as a corporate whole) and moods of diversity ( involving 
the creation of ad hoc specialised agencies in response to circumstance). 
Thus, according to Wettenhall, the pattern is determined by shifting opinion 
and not with clear cut differences in the actual problems or tasks faced 
by different agencies. Hence Hood suggests that in this view, agency type 
can only be predicted by reference to generation or date of birth.
Apart from certain etymological problems with the notion of generation, 
a fashion theory seems a weak probabilistic predictor of agency growth and 
form because peak periods for the creation of agencies seem to coincide 
roughly with periods of general government expansion, such as the 1940s, 
1960s, and 1970s so far (which interestingly has been the period of public 
sector integration through PESO, PAR and corporate decision making in 
government).
'Managerial Technology' theories on the other hand, take the view that 
it is the practicalities of different jobs which in fact determine organi­
sational form not merely changes of items in a vacuum. The broad approach 
depicted here is that of classical management science which sees organi­
sations as being built up from basic operational tasks consequently implying 
that the top structure which emerges will be closely related to the dic­
tates of these basic tasks. In the context of the public sector, Hood 
suggests three types of managerial explanation:- that 'business' type 
activities will tend to be performed by agencies, (the Morrison doctrine), 
that all tasks requiring flexibility, discretion and innovativeness will 
be performed by agencies, and finally, that 'routine' activities of any 
kind will tend to be 'hived-off' from central departments to agencies (the 
Fulton doctrine).
In examining each, counter examples can be found which weaken the 
explanation. Not all agencies are business organisations in the sense of
conducting trading or lending operations and indeed as Jordan (1976) has 
highlighted, some 'Trading Fund Organisations' such as the Ordnance Survey 
and HMSO (where current expenditure is financed from receipts and capital 
expenditure is financed by borrowings from the National Loans Fund and from 
retained earnings) have remained within the departmental framework.
Secondly, the 'innovative' argument can be countered by cases where apparently 
similar tasks are entrusted to different types of agencies and indeed much 
research is carried out intra-departmentally. Finally, the reverse
'hiving-off' argument, if put together with the 'flexibility' argument would 
explain that agencies could carry out any managerial task, a fairly unhelp­
ful conclusion.
Although Hood (1978) concludes that 'managerial' considerations do 
go some way in explaining agency type, his conception of managerial theories 
is somewhat narrow. Burns and Stalker (l96l) for example, argue from an 
'organic structure' perspective suggesting that structural change becomes 
an organisational imperative where an organisation's environment is rapidly 
changing. Further, the more turbulent the environment, the greater the 
predilection for flexible or adaptive structures. Thus government agencies 
may be seen as a means of adapting organisational structures. This 
suggests a partial explanation of the periods of general agency growth in 
the 1940s, 1960s and 1970s and might also explain why the Scottish Office 
is the sponsoring department for the largest number of agencies of all 
United Kingdom government departments (although the multi-functional nature 
of the Scottish Office must also be borne in mind). In short, Hood, by 
focussing on the more institutionalised doctrines of administrative form, 
fails to take into account the potential source of relevant literature from 
Organisational Sociology.
It is with a consideration of ’political* theories of agency 
institution that Hood's explanations become almost as numerous as the bodies 
they are trying to explain. Broadly, such explanations focus on trying to 
discern a 'political' logic in agency type but within this wide characteri­
sation, there are a number of specific strands. Firstly, a 'buffer' theory 
sees them as a way of protecting certain activities from political inter­
ference. Secondly, an 'escape' theory sees them as a way of escaping 
known weaknesses of traditional government departments. Thirdly, the 
'participation' or 'pluralistic' theory sees them as a way of diffusing 
government power. Fourthly, the 'dirigiste' theory suggests that if govern­
ment finds it cannot do the things it wants within the existing structure, 
new organisations are set up which makes it possible to do them.
Finally, the 'too many bureaucrats' view which suggests (drawing heavily 
from the American experience) that if public opinion is against government 
expansion, one way of extending government activities without increasing 
the number of civil servants is to set up agencies whose employees are then 
not classified as civil servants.
Clearly this consideration by Hood (1978) of the reasons for agency 
form and growths is ultimately a somewhat unproductive exercise. As Hood 
himself admits, one complication is that many of the explanations he discusses 
are not easily separable in practice and there are a number of major cate­
gorisation problems 'at the margin' (particularly between 'managerial' and 
'political1 theories). However, consideration of his work has served 
usefully to emphasise the diversity of reasons for the growth of this 
heterogeneous sector and confirmed to some extent the validity of the 
'Roulette Wheel' approach.
The diversity of this sector further compounds the problems of 
definition and taxonomy. Although the term 'agency* (defined by Chambers 
Twentieth Century Dictionary as the 'business of one authorised or delegated 
to transact business for another') is useful in capturing the essence of 
the characteristics of such organisations, it is in some ways much too 
broad and imprecise being able to encompass Local Authorities who would 
certainly contest being termed 'agents of government'. However, there is 
no shortage of terms which have been used to describe such bodies. One 
can choose from, non-departmental organisation, non-departmental agency, 
public corporation, public body, interstitial organisation, ad hoc agency, 
statutory special purpose authority, quasi-autonomous national government 
organisation, administrative body, semi-autonomous authority, paragovern­
mental agency, parastatal agency, fringe body, quasi-non-governmental 
organisation (the ubiquitous 'Quango'), quasi-governmental organisation, 
and finally, it has been suggested that 'quasi-non-quasi governmental or­
ganisations':- Quasi-Quangos can be discerned (Hood, 1973). Many of these 
terms, however, originate from the most recent (and in many ways the most 
comprehensive) attempt at classification by Hague, Barker and Mackenzie
(1975) who operate a 'distance from government' classification.
Hague et al attempt to chart the position of agencies along a continuum 
which moves from the State to the Private Sector, identifying four 
categories along this continuum:- Government (g ), Quasi-Governmental (QG), 
Quasi Non-Governmental Organisations (QNG) and Non-Government Organisations 
(NG). In the introductory chapter of the book, Hague defines these terms 
more fully. G, he considers to be the Civil Service, the Armed forces 
and Diplomatic Service, and given that British central government in the
last resort can use legal means to coerce local authorities, he includes 
these as G also. Apart from grossly over-simplifying the literature on 
Central-Local relations, Hague's usage differs from that of Hood (1973) 
who separates Local Authorities from both Central Government and Quago's 
and Quango's. Although Hague acknowledges that the state and private 
industry interpenetrate to such an extent through contracts and the regu­
lation and control of business (see Hood (1975) for fuller details of 
this) that it is difficult to define NG, he drops the discussion at this 
point and the category is left as vague as to be almost meaningless.
Similar confusion exists over the QG and QNG categories. The QG
category is defined in terms of 'old-fashioned nationalisation' and the
broadcasting medium,
'The story of 'old-fashioned nationalisation' has been
told many times  It is enough for our purpose to
specify this sector as quasi-government or QG.'
(p.12)
Whereas the QNG category is defined almost as every other organisation not
in the other categories,
'There are things that 'must be done' and organisations
are needed to see that they are done. It is often not
quite clear why the things in question need doing and 
there is rarely any explicit point at which a decision 
is taken to have them done.*
(p.12)
Sentiments which have been echoed recently in the popular press.
In Appendix III of the book where Hood and Mackenzie discuss
classification, their usage of the terms differs somewhat from Hague's
usage in the introduction. For instance, th^rsuggest that,
'The distinction between governmental and quasi-governmental 
bodies is far from being a precise one*.'
(p.411)
and their usage of the term QG corresponds more to Hague's QNG category 
in being a 'catch-all' category, whereas their QNG category is defined as
'government by other means' through the use of 'non-governmental agents' 
for secrecy or concealment of authorship. To complicate matters even 
further, Hood's 1973 usage of the term 'Quango' (QNG) includes bodies such 
as the Arts Council, whereas in the 1975 work with Mackenzie, the Arts 
Council is deemed to be a QG organisation.
Given the confusion and inaccurate classification which seems to 
permeate this work, criticism has been surprisingly limited to the micro­
level, merely seeking to improve the basic linear form. Thus Keeling
(1976) seeks to refine the NG category by including voluntary associations 
and distinguishing within this category:- private service agencies (for 
example the Automobile Association); industrial and commercial agencies 
(for example, trade associations); charities and industrial and commercial 
companies and partnerships with increasing distance from Government (g ). 
Jordan (1976) suggests that Departmental Agencies (intra-departmental 
organisations with full ministerial responsibility and responsible to 
parliament even on detailed decisions but often with some relaxation 
in or alternative form of accounting system) should be considered as a 
special form of G, that is g\
More fundamentally Jordan echoes the criticisms above of the dis­
tinction between QG and QNG although from a different perspective. Jordan 
suggests that insofar as the categories have any use, regulatory QNG 
organisations such as the Jockey Club are not 'Quasi-non-governmental'.
They are instead institutions deriving legitimacy > from and acting as 
if they were, Government. Similarly, as Jordan further highlights, the 
interesting feature of the Nationalised Industries and of agencies such as 
the HIDB or the Scottish or Welsh Development Agencies is that they 
represent government attempting to act as if it was 'not Government', 
that is QNG - not as Hood and Mackenzie would have it - QG.
Clearly critiques such as Jordan’s do little to clarify the use of the 
terminology and indeed ignore the basic limitations of the linea?. form.
A more macro-critique of this terminology falls into five parts.
Firstly, the classification fails to fully detail all the formal 
aspects of the relationships between administrative agencies and central 
government. An investigation of either the annual 'Directory of Paid 
Public Appointments made by Ministers' or Bowen's work on 'Fringe Bodies', 
reveals that agencies vary in their sponsoring department, their geo­
graphical areas of responsibility, their employment and staffing charac­
teristics and their expenditure levels. It would seem obvious that 
interaction between agencies and government would be structured around 
at least some of these characteristics.
Secondly, the classification being positional relating agencies to 
government in terms of perceived 'administrative distance', takes no account 
of the organisational structure at either end of the link and thus fails 
to discuss meaningfully the patterns of interaction between differently 
structured agencies and indeed differently structured government depart­
ments. For example, can one say that the interaction between the National 
Radiological Protection Board and the Department of Health is the same as 
the National Water Council’s relationship with the Department of the 
Environment?
Thirdly, the classification takes no account of agency funding and 
finance. Does whether an agency is funded through grants-in-aid statutory 
levies or financed > directly through the vote, structure the relationship 
between agencies and government differently?
Fourthly, as can be seen from Bowen's work, the methods of 
establishment of such agencies differ. Methods of establishment include
registration under the Comapnies Act, a Minister’s administrative act 
(usually a statement in Parliament), through a Royal Charter or a Royal 
Prerogative or indeed by an Act of Parliament (which is the most common 
instrument for establishing an agency). Clearly something more sophisticated 
than a linneum classification is needed both to categorise and explain 
this diversity.
Finally, the ’distance from government classification1 by focussing 
on the links between broad classes of agency and government fails to look 
at the links between agency and its environment (other agencies and its 
client group) which 'feed back' into the relationship between agency and 
government.
Criticisms of this classification thus raise a number of other issues 
which might be incorporated into a more comprehensive classification.
Given that the various a priori classifications prove futile, the way 
forward in this area is to explore the nature of the relationship between 
government and the 'fringe'. As has been suggested above such bodies 
differ in their degree of dependence on central government and this might 
indeed act as a good basis for classification. However, it is not the 
purpose of the present work to focus on developing such a classification, 
the present concern is to look at the agency as an administrative form 
before analysing its interactions with both other agencies and local 
government.
In lieu of classification, one must look for other common denominators 
to which agencies may be reduced and it is useful here to take an 
'organisation theory' perspective. As Harris and Scott (1974) suggest,
an organisation possesses:
'(a) A common set of goals applicable to all parts;
(b) An established means for pursuing these goals;
(c) An ultimate expression of the organisation’s authority
in the form of a boss or chief executive;
(d) A permanence which transcends particular tasks.1
(p.32)
Given that each agency is thus an organisation which has particular 
aims and objectives (or, to avoid reification, whose members have particular 
aims and objectives) and an institutional form for achieving this, one 
now has a basis for analysing the actions and interactions of agencies. 
Looking at agencies by way of organisation analysis serves also to usefully 
widen the notion of accountability.
As many commentators have noted, the most difficult problem which has 
arisen in connection with the government agency is how to reconcile its 
dual needs for independence and accountability to government. The case 
for an organisation's independence rests on the simple proposition that 
for the government to benefit fully from these organisations they must be 
genuinely independent (anything less and their effectiveness will be 
comprised). Yet as Pifer (1975) has pointed out, agencies serve public 
purposes and are generally financed to some extent by government. Thus 
agencies are in a state of some tension between the conflicting claims of 
independence and accountability. However, much of the discussion of agency 
accountability has been couched in unnecessarily narrow vertical terms as 
Robinson's (l97l) work shows. Robinson suggests three types of account­
ability:- 'programme' accountability (where those in an organisation are 
held responsible for the tasks that it performs - the objectives which it 
pursues); 'process' accountability (where the concern is with whether the
way the particular programme or task has been carried out is satisfactory) 
and finally 'fiscal' accountability (where the emphasis is on ensuring that 
all money has been spent on the purpose for which it was granted),
Robinson's notions of accountability seem to derive more from public 
fears of '’undemocratic' government as viewed in the popular press (see 
Edelman (1975) for an illustration of this) than any systematic consideration 
of agencies as organisations operating in particular environments#
Friend, Lind and Macdonald (1978) in discussing the relationships 
between Regional Councils and agencies suggest that it becomes important 
to develop some appreciation of the realities of decision-making in other 
fielcb of public sector activity, based on an understanding of where key 
areas of discretion lie and of the relative importance of various influences 
and constraints on the exercise of that discretion. The focus of their 
framework is on a view of the way discretion is exercised by an individual, 
a group or an agency empowered to take substantive decisions in relation 
to some area of concern. In short they argue that the use of discretion 
can be explained if one can understand firstly, the general guidelines that 
apply to the type of decision under consideration, secondly, the nature of 
the accountability for the decision and finally, 'structural appreciation' 
(the way in which these using their discretion understand the structure of 
the specific problem situation in which they are currently attempting to 
intervene).
Applying this model to public agencies gives an indication of the 
parameters of their powers and incorporates Robinson's actions of account­
ability. Guidelines for instance may occur in two forms, through the 
statutory responsibilities under the terms of the founding act or charter 
or through the more detailed day-to-day scrutiny of the sponsoring 
department, that is through both generic guidelines and specific rules.
Accountability may be requested in a number of different forms, through 
the publication of annual reports, to the incumbents of nominated board 
positions within the organisation, to other agencies with which an agency 
interacts or indeed demands to the clients of an agency. This leads in 
turn to 'structural appreciation’. Whereas guidelines emphasise certain 
general characteristics of entities which constitute cases for decisions 
and seek to impose some general classification on them, considerations of 
structure emphasise relationships which are unique to particular cases 
and thus require the use of discretion. Clearly this is a much more accurate 
dynamic picture of how organisations behave and indeed, if pursued, may 
supply the elusive basis for classification.
Before turning more fully to explore the interaction^ between agencies, 
in Chapter Three, it is important to conclude this chapter with some tent­
ative estimates of the size of this sector of government. Given that 
number estimates are a function of definition which, as can be seen above 
is somewhat problematic, any estimate of the numbers of these bodies must 
be treated somewhat cautiously. Hood (1978) suggests that most studies 
(both official and academic) indicate a figure of between 250 and 550 
organisations of a permanent nature. However, the 1978 edition of a 
'Directory of Paid Public Appointments made by Ministers' lists 616 
bodies although this treats subordinate organisations as distinct from their 
'parent' bodies (for example, the New Town Development Corporations are 
counted as units in their own right and not as part of the parent body, 
the Commission for New Towns, which is located in London).
Although Bowen’s survey reveals only 255 such organisations (as of 
1975) he does exclude, amongst other bodies, both the Nationalised 
Industries and the National Enterprise Board. The first exclusion he 
justifies somewhat weakly by suggesting that there is no accepted compre­
hensive definition of the Nationalised Industries and no precision in the 
use of the term (although Hanson and Walles (1970) argue that their role in 
the British system of public administration has been thoroughly discussed, 
a view confirmed by the amount of published case studies of these organi­
sations:- see Kelf-Cohen (1969) for further details.) Bowen's justifi­
cation for excluding the National Enterprise Board:- that it is not regarded 
by the Department of Industry as a 'fringe body' is similarly weak, as the 
Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies are included and they are to some 
extent playing the same role.
More significantly, of the 255 bodies listed by Bowen, 165 differ 
from the list provided in the 'Directory of Paid Public Appointments 
Made by Ministers'. If one allows for differences caused by the different 
categorisation of the relationship between subordinate and parent bodies, 
this still leaves up to one hundred extra bodies to be added to the list 
provided in the 'Directory'. Hence the number of government agencies 
seems closer to a figure of between 600 and 700, almost double Hood's 
estimate.
In the absence of a comprehensive classification scheme, in order to 
gauge how many bodies are likely to interact regularly with Local 
Authorities (beyond the usual demands that any organisation wishing to 
build office accommodation may have for planning permission) it is 
necessary to attempt some form of functional differentiation of these bodies,
although the inherent difficulty of this lies in the fact that many bodies 
are multi-functional and categories themselves are never unambiguous. 
However, if one discards temporarily the idea of the Local Authority as 
a corporate whole and views it instead as a discrete set of functional 
departments, one might suggest tentatively that those bodies which are 
liable to interact most with Local Authorities are those whose functional 
policy space corresponds most closely with that of Local Authority 
Departments.
Thus those bodies whose sponsoring departments are the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Department of Education and Science, 
the Department of Energy, the Department of the Environment and the 
Department of Transport, are more likely to interact with the activities 
of Local Authorities than are those bodies whose sponsoring departments 
are the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Employment, the Department 
of Health and Social Security, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the 
Home Office, the Department of Industry, the Ministry of Overseas 
Development, the Department of Trade or the Treasury. Although 
estimating the number of bodies likely to interact regularly with the 
activities of Local Authorities is compounded by the multi-functional 
Welsh and Scottish Offices, one can tentatively suggest that 271 bodies 
fall into this category. If one adjusts for duplication of New Town 
Development Corporations, Regional Water Authorities and Tourist Boards 
whose area of operation is not nationwide, this still leaves just over 200 
bodies whose activities share some degree of congruence with the Local 
Authorities.
Clearly, inter-corporate planning techniques which take account of the 
interactions between such bodies must now be considered in further detail.
CHAPTER 3 - THE INTERACTIONS OF PUBLIC
AGENCIES - TOOLS FOR ANALYSIS
The first task of this chapter is to analyse in greater detail the 
problems faced by the diversity of governmental actors in city and 
metropolitan areas. Given substantial variation between cases, it is 
clear from the analysis of Chapter Two that an important part of what is 
done in urban areas and how it is accomplished is dependent on factors, 
outside the boundaries of the formal set of Local Authority patterns that 
characterise the local unit and outside the local political arefla.
In discussing this, the 'conventional wisdom' on central-local relations 
is of little help. As Hartley (l97l) describes, the 'conventional wisdom' 
is a set of views about the nature of this relationship in which a distinc­
tion is normally drawn between the agent and partnership models of central- 
local relations. In the agent model, local authorities implement national 
policies under the supervision of central departments. Local authorities 
have little or no discretion. In the partnership model, local authorities 
and central departments are co-equals under parliament and local 
authorities have considerable discretion to design and implement their own 
policies. However, this distinction which is drawn is misleading when 
one considers the position of government agencies. Many bodies operate 
on a local or regional basis, and many of the interactions among government 
agencies and between government agencies and local authorities take place 
on a local basis. In other words, the role of government agencies in 
localities is not simply about centre-local relations (the 'accountability' 
of bodies to central government) but about local-local relations.
Thus the complex interactions between centre and locality involve 
a large number of organisations as can be seen in figure 1. The purpose 
of this illustration is simple:- to show the multilateral nature of links
FIGURE 1
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between public sector bodies. The general formula is that the number of 
links in a network will increase by the product of the number of new bodies 
times the number of original bodies, added to the number of links necessary 
among the new organisations themselves. For example, where two new bodies 
are added to an existing network of 4 (which would have 6 links), the 
number of new links would be 9 (that is, 4 x 2 + l), producing a new 
total of 15 links, a network 150$ more complex than the original one.
This apparently academic formulation has important implications for 
the ability of organisations to cope with their environment since it 
emphasises how complex this can become.
It should not be thought that the links between organisations need 
only occur in isolated pairs. The problem of urban deprivation, for 
example, would probably involve every single organisation in the 
illustration with every other organisation. The statutory functions 
relevant to the problem of urban deprivation do not lie with any one 
organisation and for an effective solution, concerted action would 
be required.
The difficulty of dividing 'policy space1 into exclusive units, 
of necessity leads to 'multiple organisational interaction* in functional 
areas in much the same way as happens in geographical space. Indeed 
authors such as Downs (1967) have offered a territorial analogy of the 
interaction between agencies. Each agency is pictured as occupying 
a policy zone which comprises of a heartland, an interior zone, a 
'no-man's land' and a periphery. Agency A's heartland is its exclusive 
zone of operation but A's interior zone, though mainly under its control, 
may be a peripheral zone for other agencies. No-man's land is where 
agencies compete on roughly equal terms. Although Down's analogy 
offers a simplified version of a phenomenon which is considerably more
complex, network maps such as figure 1 suggest that the relationships
are far from hypothetical,they are a necessary component of effective
action by government at all levels as is emphasised by the discussion
of 'ungovernability' in modern Britain.
'The growing complexity of government tends to make government 
overcomplex, reducing its efficiency and upon occasion, its 
effectiveness.
.•• Today, the chief policies of government depend for 
success upon the results of complex processes of inter­
action that can be influenced but not controlled by 
government.'
(Rose, 1978, p.15, P*36) 
The need for coordination of organisations in policy situations 
is nowhere better illustrated than in case studies of policy imple­
mentation, a subject which Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) contend 'has 
been often discussed but rarely studied'. (Meyerson and Banfield's 
(1955) case study of the problems facing the establishment of public 
housing programmes in Chicago being a notable exception to this.)
Pressman and WildaYsky in a serious attempt to 'grapple with the 
problem' offer in the form of another case study, the story of the 
activities of the Economic Development Agency (the EDA) in the city of 
Oakland. The brief of the EDA was to provide jobs for racial minorities, 
a goal it attempted to achieve through financial aid schemes for public 
works and local enterprises, a task which was perceived to be simple 
enough but which met with depressing outcomes. Over a period of six 
years (1965-1971) only twenty new jobs were created and much money spent. 
Yet as Hood (1976) highlights, the external conditions of what he terms 
'perfect administration* were met in this case as the programme was 
well-funded and enjoyed strong political support. As it was a seemingly 
innocent programme which ran into substantial difficulties, Pressman 
and Wildavisky postulate that perfectly ordinary circumstances may 
present serious obstacles for implementation. Indeed as Jenkins 
(1978) somewhat caustically suggests, in many policy arenas it may be
a difficult enough task to get even the ordinary to happen.
The erratic progress of the EDA in Oakland touches on many issues 
similar to that of the Chicago case discussed by Meyerson and Banfield. 
The EDA and local interests found themselves with conflicting goals 
(for example, business development versus the need of the long term 
unemployed) while at another level different perspectives existed 
on the part of EDA personnel in Oakland and Washington. More des­
tructively, it appears that while substantial agreement may have existed 
on the ends of the programme, participants often either opposed the 
means proposed by others or saw little to be gained in making any 
move towards action themselves. The overall result of this and 
related factors was that policies never mobilised sufficient support 
at any one time to make substantial progress; a reflection of the 
fact that each actor or organisation worked within its own system of 
constraints. Hood (1976) suggests that this basic problem is usefully 
described by the phrase ’Multi-Organisational sub-optimisation1 which 
refers to situations where different parts of inter-connected systems 
are separately administered in such a way as to render the total admini­
strative effect ineffective or counter productive. For Pressman and 
Wildavsky the process of policy implementation is therefore essentially 
a series of interrelated decisions involving a multiplicity of actors 
none of whom (in the Oakland case) had any marked degree of control 
over the situation. This arises in part out of the complexity (in 
aggregate terms) of the organisational situation and in part because 
implementation is (certainly in this case and most probably generally) 
divorced from policy.
Thus the difficulties which arose in implementing the programme 
were seen by Pressman and WildaVsky in terms of 'steering* the organi­
sations contributing to the programme through a variety of 'decision 
paths' and 'clearance points'. Owing to the fact that probabilities 
combine multiplicatively and thus become smaller in combination where 
they are less than unity, Pressman and WildaVsky produce a model whereby 
programmes of comparatively small complexity will be overwhelmingly 
likely to be blocked, even assuming a very high propensity of all 
participants to agree at all the necessary 'clearance points'. The 
policy imperative thus emerging from the Oakland study is that the 
study of implementation requires the understanding that apparently 
simple sequences of events depend on complex chains and networks of 
reciprocal interaction. Hence the analysis is of value in directing 
one towards the organised complexity of the policy sphere in which 
organisations manoeuvre to control their environment and impose their 
definition of the situation on others.
Like Pressman and WildaVsky, Williams (l97l) identifies 'a 
lacuna between decision and implementation' a central reason for which 
is seen to be the absence of an 'implementation capacity1 ('the capacity 
of an organisation to put in place a policy decision in such a way that 
objectives are likely to be reached1). For Williams a theory of 
implementation becomes very much a theory of organisational development 
since it links the strands of organisational design and motivation.
Roos (1974) echoes Williams and suggests that implementation theory in 
a normative form at least is essentially a theory of organisations 
and their interactions. Yep (1974) adds that coordination has been 
an explicit or implicit concern of most interorganisational analysis 
(citing Miller (1958) and Reid (1964) as examples). Thus before
focussing more sharply on the twin interrelated concerns that planners 
have in multi-organisation situations, the methods of co-ordination of 
units and the organisational design of such situations, it will be 
necessary to examine further the concepts and literature of 'inter- 
organisational1 sociology.
The literature of organisational sociology has expanded at an 
enormous rate throughout the post-war period, and in the past decade 
especially, there has been a specific concern amongst organisational 
sociologists in focussing on the links between the organisation and its 
environment. The comparatively underdeveloped discipline inter- 
organisational sociology concentrates on one aspect of the general link, 
namely the link between an organisation and other organisations in 
its environment. Rhodes (1979) suggests that the subject tends to 
oscillate between the two extremes of 'grand theory' and 'abstracted 
empiricism', a problem compounded by the lack of paradigmatic agreement 
on either the most important concepts or their meaning. Given this 
and the volume of literature concerned, it would clearly be unwise to 
attempt to review the field entirely as this is not the concern of the 
present study. Rather, it is possible to approach inter-organisational 
sociology through the work of authors who have used the subject to analyse 
the relationships and management of public sector organisations and 
from these, to abstract general themes. Thus it is proposed to look 
at the work of Elkin (1975) on Comparative Urban Politics, the work of 
Crozier and Thoenig (1976) on Central-Local relations in France,
Rhodes' (1979) analysis of Central-Local relations in Britain and finally 
the two interrelated workds of Friend, Yewlett and Power (1974) on the
inter-organisational expansion of an English town and Harris and Scott's 
(1974) work on 'multi-organisations’. Although the latter two studies 
fall more properly within the field of inter-governmental relations, 
this approach shares many of the concepts of inter-organisational 
sociology.
At the outset as William Evan (1966) notes, the
'phenomena and problems at issue in this analysis of relations 
between organisations are part of the general class of 
boundary relation problems confronting all types of social 
systems'
(p.175)
The premise of the inter-organisational approach is that organisational
processes cannot be adequately explaihed except for reference to the
impact of actors outside the organisation, an insight common in the
social sciences being central to such lines of inquiry as political
integration and social conflict. The basic assumption in the literature
is thus that the organisation is an 'open system'. As Emery and Trust
pointed out in I960,
'... there has been something of a tendency to continue 
thinking in terms of a 'closed system', that is, to 
regard the enterprise as sufficiently independent to 
allow most of its problems to be analysed with reference 
to its internal structure and without reference to its 
external environment.*
(p.281)
They argued instead for an 'open system' perspective, that is the 
recognition of the 'mutual permeation of an organisation and its 
environment', and further suggest that environmental changes are a 
major source of uncertainty for an organisation. However, the problem 
with this formulation is its high level of generality. It is difficult 
to disagree with the general statements that the environment permeates 
the organisation and that there are different types of uncertainty.
From an inter-organisational perspective, it is important to know
which of all possible organisations any given organisation will interact
with.
In an attempt to confront this problem Elkin draws on and attempts 
to synthesise the work of three authors, Benson (l975)> Thompson 
(1966, 1967) and Evan (1966). Firstly, Elkin suggests that the most 
useful image in capturing the ’openness1 of city politics is that of 
a ’network' (following Benson) of governmental organisations having 
as its focus the local territorial unit. In Elkin's view (again 
following Benson) the level of interdependence is relatively high 
between organisations in the network as compared with that between 
these organisations and other actors. Secondly, Elkin argues that 
beyond this, one may think of each organisation as having a 'domain' 
(following Thompson), that is, a sphere of competence which an organi­
sation uses to define 'needed' and 'relevant' resources for itself and 
which it seeks to protect and expand. If there is no 'domain consensus' 
that is, agreement on the goals pursued in each organisation by other 
organisations, conflict between organisations will occur. Elkin further 
suggests that each of the organisations in the network may be said to 
be seeking autonomy. However, they are not autonomous but in varying 
degrees interdependent and it is the management of this dependence on 
others in the network that is of central interest. Here Elkin's 
use of the term 'network' seems to correspond more with Evan's notion 
of the 'organisational set' which is defined as 'an organisation or a 
class of organisations and its interactions with the network of orga­
nisations in its environment', the organisation that is the point of 
reference being termed the 'focal organisation'.
Given Elkin's general concern to look at the focal organisation 
and its management of dependence of the other organisations with which 
it deals, Elkin shifts the focus of analysis from a characterisation 
of organisational environment to a discussion of inter-organisational 
exchange theory by focussing more fully on the concept of dependence.
The most important single statement of the concept of dependence 
in the context of inter-organisational analysis is that of Thompson 
(1967) who suggests that any given organisation is dependent upon 
other organisations,
(X) in proportion to the organisation's need for 
resources or performances which that element, can 
provide and (2) in inverse proportion to the ability 
of other elements to provide the same resources or 
performance.'
(p.30)
And dependence is the obverse of power,
'... an organisation has powerrelative to an element 
of its task environment to the extent that the 
organisation has the capacity to satisfy needs of that 
element and to the extent that the organisation 
monopolises that capacity.'
(p.31)
The importance of the concept of dependence and the reason that 
it is stressed more than the concept of power lies in the fact that it 
admits of reciprocity. An organisation can both be dependent upon 
another organisation and have power over that organisation. Thus 
Elkin lists strategies that focal organisations use in managing dependence, 
strategies such as co-alition, co-optation, exchange (bargaining of 
resources), penetration (attempts to penetrate the organisation on 
which it is dependent), socialisation of conflict (attempts to widen 
the scope of conflict by invoking previously uninvolved parties who 
will alter the balance of opinion and resources), and setting up or 
making use of a supra-organisation. Obviously the danger exists that 
a new strategy can be invented to use in the analysis of individual 
case studies, however Elkin does attempt to relate strategies to the 
resource characteristics of the organisation. For example, organisations 
with limited resources are more likely to attempt to manage dependence
through co-alition, penetration and trying to push the problem up to 
an existing supra-organisation rather than through co-optation, exchange 
or trying to build a supra-organisation.
Although Elkin suggests that his inter-organisational perspective 
outlined above provides a 'language to handle some of the fundamental 
problems of comparative urban political inquiry' (p.183) his checklist 
suffers from a lack of operationalisation and indeed his use of the 
terms 'focal organisation', 'organisation set' and 'network' are 
fairly loose, (Benson's notion of 'network' seems more of an alter­
native to Evan's focal organisation set - not a cumulative extension 
of it).
Crozier and Thoenig (1976) however partly fill this gap by attempting 
to describe these processes of inter-organisational dependency arguing 
that,
'The literature has correctly pointed out that all relations 
of the organisation with the environment are relationships 
of dependence. But it has generally given a description and 
classification of the resources of power enjoyed in these 
relationships rather than a demonstration of the mechanisms 
of the game between the parties.'
(p.562)
Crozier's (1964) starting point for correcting this omission is 
with the power relations within the organisation. Although Crozier 
admits that there is still a problem with the definition and identifica­
tion of power, for him an understanding of power distribution is crucial 
to an explanation of the organisation's existence and performance.
Central to this thesis is a focus on groups and the struggle between 
groups for resources, a struggle that creates uncertainties around them:- 
1 Groups fight for control of the ultimate strategic sources of uncer­
tainties and their fates in the group struggle' (Crozier, 1964, p.107)*
In recent years this position has been developed further by Hickson 
(l97l) and Child (1972) whilst still retaining Crozier's basic con­
tention that variation in organisational output is linked with power 
'games' between competing groups*
Nor is the game confined to relationships within the organisation.
It can be applied to relations between organisations,
'Regulation is the basic mechanism of organisations.
From that point of view, there is no difference in 
kind, but only a difference in degree between an 
organisation and an interorganisational network.
Both are social and human systems, more or less stable 
and structured, integrating various units, regulating 
their behaviour, and imposing a collective game on 
their members.'
(Crozier and Thoenig, p.563) 
Confirmation of this view can be found in the empirical application 
of the theory to the system of central-local relations in France.
The earliest application is Worm’s (1966) study of the 'game' which 
takes place between prefects and 'notables'. Conventionally the 
prefect has always been regarded as representing the interests of the 
'state' and the 'notable' as defender of local interests. Yet both 
are interdependent; the success of one depends upon the other. The 
prefect is judged on his ability to 'get things done' within his 
department and this would be impossible without a degree of co-operation 
from dominant members of the local community. In turn, the notable, 
especially the mayor, has an interest in co-operating with the prefect. 
The mayor is competing with dher mayors in the department for resources 
from the centre and his success as a mayor depends upon his ability to
secure benefits from the state. Thus both the prefects and the 
'notables' are interested in complicity for the purposes of bargaining 
with Paris. For the notable, the prefect is the channel of access to 
Paris. For the prefect, his ability to claim control over local 
reactions to central policies gives him greater freedom of action in 
bargaining with Paris. Therefore the prefect and 'his notables' 
engage in transactions where certain 'convergences' or 'breaking of 
rules for mutual benefit' may be detected.
Crozier and Thoenig (1976) have extended the idea of the game to 
the whole structure of 'territorial administration' in France (see 
figure 2). At each level there exist relations of dependence around 
which games evolve. There are two separate channels of territorial 
administration, the elected channel and administrative channel with 
areas of common interest between members of each of the channels and 
within each channel. But communication is not structured vertically 
or horizontally. Rather the system is one of 'cross-regulation'.
Each member of a channel tries to have his interests favoured by members 
of the other channels upon whom they are dependent. In spite of the 
complexity of this 'honeycomb' pattern of relations, however, the game 
is remarkably stable because it provides benefit to each participant.
All have a vested interest in preserving the status quo.
Although Crozier and Thoenig have produced a substantial piece 
of research, their insistence that inter-organisational processes are 
merely an extension of intra-organisational processes is somewhat suspect• 
Although, as has been pointed out above, similar processes do occur 
in organisations, goal enforcement of agreed or negotiated goals tends 
to be less problematic. Secondly, Crozier and Thoenig only consider 
a unilateral link between two hierarchies. As has also been emphasised
FIGURE 2
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above, public policy making is a consequence of multi-lateral links 
between organisations. The third weakness of Crozier and Thoenig's 
analysis lies in their lack of consideration of resources. The 
empirical studies are based on the perceptions of participants of their 
relative power. As such the methodology has a marked affinity with 
the reputational methods employed in American community power studies, 
a methodology which has rather a large number of weaknesses including 
the difficulty that at best, it is only tapping potential power, not 
power as exercised.
Rhodes (1979) has attempted to develop and synthesise salient 
points from both of these perspectives into what he terms an inter­
governmental 'Power-Dependence' framework for the analysis of the 
relationship of public sector organisations. The framework contains 
five propositions:-
First, any organisation occupies a complex environment which has 
manifold repercussions upon it because this environment is composed 
of other organisations which are sources of needed resources.
Secondly, in order to achieve their goals, the organisations in 
this network of relationships have to exchange resources.
Thirdly, although decision-making within an organisation is 
constrained by other organisations, the 'dominant coalition' (the 
dominant group within the organisation at a particular time which sped 
fies the organisational goals) retain some discretion. The 
'appreciative system' of the dominant coalition (which may be crudely 
interpreted as a combination of interests, expectations and ideology
structures the understanding of, and reaction to, the environment) 
influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which resources 
will be sought.
Fourthly, the dominant coalition employs strategies within 
known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange.
Fifthly, variations in the degree of discretion are a product of 
the goals and the relative power potential of interacting organisations. 
This 'relative power potential' is a product of the resources of each 
organisation, of the rules of the game and of the process of exchange 
between organisations.
Although Rhodes (1979) developed this framework initially for 
analysing central-local relations, Rhodes himself notes the need to 
incorporate government agencies in the analysis. Indeed, his approach 
will be more fruitful when applied to relations involving government 
agencies thai.central department-local authority ones, since many of 
the formal characteristics of a particular tier of local authority will 
be common to all authorities, whereas there is a wider scope for vari­
ation between government agencies because of the variety of forms which 
they take. The scope available to each organisation in selecting 
its options for dealing with other organisations will depend on the 
resources of different kinds which each has and those which it needs 
from other organisations. Different organisations will have different 
distributions of the resources and therefore different implied cons­
traints on the options available to them. Hogwood (1979) suggests 
that the resources available to organisations will depend on a number 
of characteristics, which are presented in list form below. Many of 
the categories listed may, of course, overlap in practice.
Legal Resources
Composition and Appointment of Governing Boards and Committees
Size and Nature of Staff
Finance
Locality Factors
Nature of roles and policy tasks
Strategic sequential position (extent to which activities of the 
organisation have to be carried out prior to or parallel with 
the activities of other organisations)
Technical/professional resources
Informational resources
Political resources
Personal factors
Internal organisational integration
Clearly more research needs to be done in correlating and ranking 
these resource elements of government agencies. Future research 
might be directed at attempting to compile a ’discretion index' of 
government agencies using computer analysis and ranking. However, 
given the present state of knowledge and indeed the scope of this work 
it is useful merely to highlight these resource categories.
Unfortunately, the literature on inter-organisational sociology 
does not offer a particularly cohesive model of the interaction between 
organisations, a difficulty which pervades most fields of study. 
Focussing, as has been done above, on particular theoretical derivatives 
of the field largely obscures the considerable disagreement over con­
cepts such as the nature of the environment or the organisation set 
us the network. However common ground does exist. Other organisations 
are seen to be an important aspect of the environment of any particular 
organisation and out of such interdependence arises the employment of 
strategies and a complex picture of organisations negotiating and
bargaining with one another. Given this, it is important obviously to 
look at management techniques and organisational design to structure 
these situations and it is to a consideration of this that attention 
is now turned, through a focus on 'Intergovernmental Relations'.
Wright (l974) in a review of Inter-Governmental Relations, identi­
fies five features which have characterised the field. First, Inter- 
Governmental Relations recognises the multiplicity of relationships 
between all types of government. Although usually applied to federal 
systems, Wright argues that IGR is a much broader term covering all the 
relationships illustrated, for example, in figure 1. Secondly, it 
emphasises the interactions between individuals, especially public 
officials. Thirdly, IGR recognises the continuous day-to-day pattern 
of contracts, knowledge and evaluations of government officials and 
stresses informal working relationships in institutional contests. 
Fourthly, IGR is distinguished by its focus on all political actors, 
both politicians and administrators. As Wright remarks 'the increased 
focus on administrators as relevant IGR participants is a natural 
outgrowth of the increasingly important role played by public bureau­
cracies in government' (p.416). A fifth and final feature of IGR 
is its policy component. Not only does it focus on 'Who Governs?1 
but also looks at the political and social component of policy by asking 
'Who Benefits?'. It is into this context that one can place the work 
of Friend et al (1974) at the Institute for Operational Research and 
the discussion by Harris and Scott (l974) on multi-organisation design.
As if to reinforce the earlier point that there is no agreed set
of concepts for the analysis of inter-organisational and inter-governmental
relations, Friend et al have developed their own vocabulary. The basic
concept from which other terms are developed is that of the 'policy
system1 which is
'••. any set of organisational and interpersonal 
arrangements which has to deal with some identifiable 
class of decision problems'
(p.24)
This policy system (loosely modelled on the stimulus-response models 
of cognitive psychologists) has both internal and external relations.
The external relations are classified into three broad groups:- the 
operating environment; the set of policy values in the community which 
require to be 'managed' through some form of policy sounding; and 
contiguous policy systems, or other policy systems in which related 
problems can arise. Each of these features of the environment can 
give use to its own type of uncertainty (a point which the authors 
draw from Friend and Jessop's 1969 work). As soon as the actors respond 
to uncertainty by broadening the context through some wider process of 
exploration in conjunction with other interconnected issues, they 
undertake a process of strategic choice. The broader the context, the 
more comprehensive the planning process, the greater the need for co- 
ordinative or connective planning across continuous policy systems which 
are virtually independent in that each operates through a distinctive 
set of policy guidelines with little or no common ground between them.
In the absence of consensually based policy guidelines and the existence 
of a central decision-maker, the situation veers towards what Lindblom 
(1965) terms 'partisan mutual adjustment' and disjointed incremental 
action is the result. Needless to say, the tendency towards partisan 
mutual adjustment increases in direct proportion to the complexity of 
the action space.
Alternatively, the actors may form joint agencies to deal with a
problem, that is what Stringer (1967) terms a 'multi-organisation'
which is defined as,
'the union of parts of several organisations, each part 
being a subset of the interests of its own organisation,'
(p.106)
A multi^organisation could be established, for example when the various 
actors recognise the difficulty of working through partisan mutual 
adjustment. However, Friend et al (1974) further suggest that such 
a joint policy system may not always be very effective, especially 
where the actors must remain responsive to conflicting constituency 
interests. As in the more structured type of conflict situation 
analysed by writers in coalition theory, rational but partisan decision 
makers will only be concerned to maintain a sufficient level of co­
alition to maximise their expected gains.
Finally, to cope with the complex patterns of communication which 
may arise between decision-makers in such circumstances, the concept 
of 'decision network' is introduced. This as defined by Friend (1976) 
describes,
'... any more flexible and adaptive arrangements for communi­
cation between a set of decision-makers directly or 
indirectly concerned in some identifiable class of problems, 
but without necessarily subscribing to any shared policy 
guidelines.'
(p.38)
Friend et al (1974) apply this conceptual framework to the problem of 
controlled dispersal of population and employment away from the 
Birmingham conurbation and in particular to the expansion of the small 
town of Droitwich to receive Birmingham overspill population. Of 
necessity, this required inter-agency agreement; that is, the creation 
of a multi organisation in the form of Droitwich Development Group
and Committee, the structure of which is shown in figure 3« The full 
complexity of the situation, however, does not emerge until particular 
decisions are analysed and the linkages between the variety of organis­
ations involved is highlighted (as is shown in figure 4). Observation 
of this leads Friend et al (1974) to the conclusion already appreciated 
by readers of this work, that policy-making in the public sector is 
characterised by multiple links between organisations*
The significance of the work for the present study is their focus
not only on the pattern of interactions between organisations but also
on the process of planning. The thrust of their argument is essentially
that inter-organisational linkages act as a constraint on a rational
or planning approach to public decisions. Because complexity of
action space generates bargaining and incremental adjustments, time
and effort has to be devoted to managing the linkages. The decision
to activate and indeed develop these links is particularly important
and depends to a great extent on the 'network managing' or 'reticulist'
skills of those local actors who play important 'boundary roles' at
the interface between agencies. In more detail and as refined by Power
(1971), the role is seen as
'initiating and cultivating a network of human relationships in such 
. a way as to maintain access to information about changing problem - 
situations which he expects to interact in a significant way with 
these particular types of decision over which he wishes to be 
able to exert some practical influence.'
(p.23)
Hence the reticulist sounds out opinion, identifies areas and 
issues for joint decision making and generally acts as a contact man 
or troubleshooter for his organisation in its relationships with others*
FIGURE 5
MULTI ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF DROITWICH TOWN DEVELOPMENT
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His position in an organisation may vary from a position of central 
corporate authority to the more peripheral positions at the edges of 
an organisation. It is important to note that for Friend et al (1974) 
policy-making is not ohly the design and implementation of policies, it 
also involves the deliberate and conscious activation of organisational 
networks.
Clearly Friend et al (l974) have produced a substantial piece of 
work which in essence suggests two approaches to the rationalising of 
multiple organisation interaction. The first is to create a 'multi- 
organisation' with mutually agreed policy guidelines, the second, the 
development of reticulist skills in a situation of partisan mutual 
adjustment. However, both of these concepts as developed by Friend 
et al (1974) have their weaknesses. A multi-organisation conceived 
of in terms of pursuing a common plan is one very specific form of an 
inter-organisational relationship. Organisations interact with each 
other without pursuing a common task. Secondly, partisan mutual 
adjustment defined of in terms of negotiation and bargaining does not 
(as has been seen above) encompass the full range of strategies open 
to an organisation. As has been discussed ahove, organisations can 
compete or co-operate and attempt to disrupt and manipulate as well 
as negotiating agreements. Given that Friend et al (1974) consider 
such a limited range of strategies, it is scarcely surprising to note 
that they offer no explanation as to why some strategies are adopted 
rather than others.
The concept of the 'multi-organisation' has been developed further 
by Harris and Scott (1974) who attempt a classification of 'multi­
organisations' in relation to the individual participants: the insti­
tution set up to co-ordinate action (which they term the 'representative 
body'): and in relation to the amount of control which the individual
participants have over the representative body. Using these factors 
they suggest seven states that multi-organisations exist in, all of 
which derive from the basic motivation of authorities in increasing 
their own control over systems in whic h their individual influence is 
limited. A common example of multi-organisation is 'State II', which 
is a consultative committee between bodies in which the individual 
participants retain all significant decision-making powers to themselves. 
In a 'State III' multi-organisation, however, significant powers are 
delegated to the representative body by the participants. The represen­
tatives are trusted to maintain the interests of their respective 
organisations although the participating bodies limit these delegated 
powers and retain certain key powers. Clearly the Droitwich Town 
Development Agreement (discussed above) established a State III multi­
organisation. The more general theme to emerge in Harris and Scott's 
work is that different types of multi-organisation are suitable for 
handling different sorts of tasks, the implication being that there must 
be a connection between the environment and the multi-organisational 
state which gives greatest satisfaction to its participants.
What then can one abstract from this discussion of inter- 
organisational analysis? Clearly certain themes are dominant, power, 
bargaining, adjustment, discretion and dependence, giving an overall 
perspective of situations which are complex but poorly structured. 
Management techniques and the processes of organisational design 
suggested, tend to reflect this. Taken from a cybernetics 
perspective, communication is seen as crucially important in structuring 
the relations between contiguous policy systems, a point which is perhaps 
most evident in the conception of the reticulist role. More importantly 
inter-organisational analysis provides a framework with which to analyse 
and critically evaluate multiple organisation situations and the 
management techniques by which they are structured. It is to a 
consideration of this that attention is now turned.
CHAPTER 4 - MULTIPLE-ORGANISATION MANAGEMENT - 
A CONSIDERATION OF THREE EXAMPLES
It is evident from the above discussion that Local Authorities
operate in an environment of complex patterns of organisational inter­
action and that as a consequence, public policy-making is becoming 
increasingly fragmented amongst various organisations, semi-autonomous 
agencies, central government departments and local authorities. 
Paradoxically, this is happening at a time when the need for coordination
in public policy-making as a whole Is the accepted orthodoxy. As
Hood (1976) emphasises, the multi-dimensional problem of inner-city 
decline and the corresponding need for co-ordinated policy-making is 
now appreciated,
’It is well known that the general problem of
urban deprivation involves a number of separately
administered but highly inter-related elements.
Schools, housing, transport, health care and the 
administration of justice are perhaps only the 
most obvious cases. Improving any one of these 
inter-connected yet separately administered 
elements on its own may be ineffective.'
(pp.17-18)
This developing awareness of the inter-relationships between urban 
problems and the perceived inability of highly departmentalised local 
government to deal with them fuelled the arguments for the introduction 
of corporate planning and management techniques into Local Authorities 
almost ten years ago. Given the concern of the present study on the 
management of an increasingly organisationally diverse public sector, 
it is worth focussing briefly on the theory and practice of Corporate 
Management as not only is it the major managerial response to imposing 
order on rapid urban social change but it also has implications far 
beyond its obvious intra-organisational perspective.
The changes which have taken place in the management of local 
government are not simply improvements in methods and techniques*
They are to a substantial extent, a manifestation of changing conceptions 
of the role of local government. Rhodes (1978) argues that there has 
been a shift from a traditional conception (wherein local government 
services are provided in isolation from each other) to a federal 
conception (wherein departments are merged, the committee structure 
simplified and coordination improved). More significantly as Greenwood 
and Stewart (1974) highlight, there has been a shift to a governmental 
conception which emphasises the need to reform the 'process' of manage­
ment rather than the formal internal structure. Such reforms include 
the review of activities in relation to the needs and problems in the 
environment, the setting of objectives and, above all, the need for 
management in local government to be directed at supporting the 
development of corporate policy making rather than the limited goals of 
coordination and efficiency. In sum, as Stewart (l97l) emphasises, 
this general philosophy of management
'•.. rests on the view that the local authority is 
the 'primary' organ of government within the area 
for which it is responsible. Within the area it 
administers, individuals, families and organisations 
have developed a pattern of life. This pattern 
has been deeply influenced by the environment - 
both the natural, physical environment and the 
social economic, political and technical environ­
ment. In a very real sense, the general management of 
a local authority is the management of that environment, 
for the individuals, groups and organisations that 
live within that environment*'
(p.17)
Turning from the philosophy of corporate management to the processes 
of management associated with corporate planning, the general presumption 
can be translated into a more specific form. The process of management, 
it is argued, should be the basic rationalist model of identifying
needs, generating objectives in relation to these needs, choosing be­
tween alternative means of achieving these objectives, putting the 
choice into practice and evaluating the end result with the ultimate 
intention of ’meeting the needs of the population to the maximum 
extent consistent with available resources' (Stewart, 1971, p.30). 
Structurally, the organisational changes necessary to achieve this are 
well known, the Chief Executive, the Management Team, the Policy 
Committee and the Policy Planning Unit have all been discussed in 
detail elsewhere and need no further discussion here. However, it 
should be stated again that in the theory, the emphasis falls on the 
need for structures to suggest the new processes of management, 
structural change for its own sake is seen as a fruitless exercise.
Harris and Scott (1974) suggest that there is an obvious danger 
that the corporate planning process can become introspective and 
centralised and in the process, lose credibility with those departments 
operating programmes which overlap with the activities of other agencies. 
Further, they suggest that if corporate planning is to become effective 
it will need to recognise the inter-authority nature of public policy­
making. This criticism, however, is to some extent misdirected.
Part of the rationale for Redcliffe Maud's suggestions in favour of the 
large, new all-purpose authority was that it could relate its programmes 
for all services to coherent objectives for the future progress of its 
area considered as a whole. Indeed, the ghost of Stewart is never 
far away as is evident in this quotation.
'Local Government has moved a long way from the 
days when its task was to provide a number of 
isolated services. Authorities are now responsible 
for a great deal of the context in which the lives 
of citizens are lived. Control of the physical 
environment, economic development, collaboration 
with other agencies of all kinds, public and private,
as well as the provision of local services are 
now their business. They have a duty positively 
to promote the welfare of the community.'
(para 486)
Similar themes are echoed in the Bains Report. At the risk of
repetition, the Report's central axium is worth noting,
'Local Government is not, in our view, limited to 
the narrow provision of a series of services to the 
local community.... It has within its purview the 
overall economic, cultural and physical well­
being of that community.'
(para 2.10)
In keeping with this overview, the most significant aspect of the
Report however concerns the broadening of the scope of corporate
planning. As has been frequently noted above, the growth of public
agencies has removed some of the functions from local government
services in part which are integral to many other functions of the
local authority. For instance, house building cannot proceed on any
large scale without piped water and sewage disposal facilities. In
recognition of this new situation, the horizons of local authority
management broadened. If the community as a whole is to be served,
'We believe that this concept of 'community' 
interest must involve not only the new local 
authorities, but also other voluntary and 
public agencies....1
(Bains, para 8.4)
Corporate planning has to become concerned therefore,
'•.. with planning to meet the problems and 
needs of the community within a specified area 
irrespective of the particular organisation 
that might be involved - or whether even any 
organisation would be involved.'
(Stewart, 1974, p*68)
It is evident from the quotations above that the local authority
is very much regarded as the prime, focal organisation within a parti­
cular area; hence the somewhat introspective concern with the internal 
management structure of local authorities. Thus while it is evident 
from the above quotations that the multiplicity of governmental 
organisations within the local authority area is obviously recognised, 
the methodology of inter-corporate decision making is not specified 
beyond the broad exhortation that,
'each authority be aware and take into account the 
interaction between the plans, policies and 
functions for which it is responsible and those of 
other agencies.'
(Bains, para 3*4)
Similarly Stewart and Eddison's (l97l) notion of 'Community Planning' 
fails to be translated into specific processes in the way the corporate 
model has been. Indeed they go as far as to suggest that it is 
probably unattainable to be able to expect to plan the activities of 
other organisations.
The viability of corporate management theories to be extended 
inter-corporately reflects the qualitative difference between intra 
and inter-organisational processes. Although, as has been emphasised 
above, intra and inter organisational processes share some common 
emphases (for example, goals in both situations arise out of a bar­
gaining process) there is more scope within an organisation for internal 
discipline in relation to these goals than is likely in an inter-corporate 
situation where constituent organisations are more concerned 
to 'defend' organisational autonomy and thus less likely to concede 
policy space. As Stewart, Eddison and Bains must realise, it is 
difficult to specify the processes of management required in situations 
which may at best tend towards partisan mutual adjustment or at worst 
tend toward the anomic.
However, continuing analysis at this theoretical level is to 
ignore the existence of structured multiple organisation situations 
in the public sector in which organisations including both Local 
Authorities and government agencies do interact in order to formulate 
policy and carry out tasks. It is proposed to look at the organis­
ational design and management techniques used in three of these 
situations using the concepts of inter-organisational sociology as 
discussed in chapter three. Thus the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal
I
Scheme has been selected as it is a good example of a 'multi- j
1
organisation' which encompasses the interests of two tiers of local i  
authority and three government agencies. Passenger Transport planning 
in the Passenger Transport Executive's (PTE's) has been chosen to 
illustrate how a local authority agency attempts to regulate the
activities of central government agencies. Finally, a critical appraisal
will be made of the potential of future Regional Reports in Scotland to
act as inter-corporate documents on the basis of the first round of
reports produced soon after the newly constituted Regional Councils 
took office in 1975* However, these studies are not intended to be 
fully comprehensive case studies of particular policy situations.
Given the scope of this present work, they are merely intended to be 
used as examples of public policy making which illustrates the useful­
ness of looking at these situations from an inter-organisational 
perspective*
The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme
In May 1976, the new Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr Bruce 
Millan, announced a £120 million plan to tackle urban deprivation in 
the east end of Glasgow, an area which amounted to over 5 square miles 
and contained about 65,000 people (considerably lower than its earlier
population)* Original hopes for the project were high as Millan
revealed,
'The difference between this scheme and others 
produced before it, however well thought out and 
imaginative they were, is that this is not just a 
plan on paper but a plan for action which will
begin to take place very soon indeed*'
(The Times, 22 May 1976)
There is a certain 'post-hoc' irony to these words. As is well
known by the inhabitants of the area and indeed well documented by
Malone (1979), implementation of this project has at best been partial
and in some respects non-existent. It is the contention of this
study that this 'administrative inertia* is a direct consequence of the
poor organisational design of the project and its failure to take into
account multiple-organisational interactions systematically, beyond
the level of broad exhortations such as,
'It is agreed that the success of the project 
depends on ensuring that the planning processes 
are carried out on the basis of full consultation 
between the participants and that implementation 
is properly co-ordinated. This calls for 
maximum co-operation between officials of the 
participating bodies, and full use of the 
specialist staff and accumulated experience which 
each possesses*'
(Section 13 - GEAR - Working document 
on Organisation)
The announcement of the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) scheme 
should be seen in the local context of the cancellation of Stonehouse 
New Town and, more generally, of the switch in emphasis suggested by 
Strathclyde Regional Council in the Regional Report from building on 
green field sites to renewing urban areas along the 'corridor of 
deprivation'. At Central Government level, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland, anxious to show some action in the face of this first 
'Report' published in May 1976, and influenced by the growing awareness
of the true scale of inner-city problems (both through the publication 
of census data analysis and through internal labour party policy 
documents) indicated the de-designation of Stonehouse New Town and 
announced the institution of the GEAR project (which was seen by some 
commentators as a substitute for the 'Strathclyde Economic Development 
Corporation' (SEDCOR) as originally suggested in the 'ad-hoc' West 
Central Scotland Plan (1974))*
The most important feature of the renewal programme is the 
multiplicity of organisations involved: the Scottish Office (organised
corporately through their Urban Renewal Group of Officers), Glasgow 
District Council (GDC), Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC), the Scottish 
Development Agency (SDA) and the Scottish Special Housing Association 
(SSHA), the latter two of course being government agencies. All of 
these are linked inter-corporately in the creation of the GEAR multi­
organisation (although, as will be obvious, other organisations not 
represented will need to be involved, for example, British Rail and 
other transport agencies).
As will be recalled from Harris and Scott's (1974) work outlined 
above, they identify three elements in a multi-organisation: the
individual participant organisations, the representative body (to take 
decisions with some degree of independence from the individual 
participants) and in highly developed forms of multi-organisation, the 
agency delegated to carry out technical work in relation to its task. 
This framework can be developed by synthesising it with Rhodes' (1979) 
power dependence concept and this will be applied in analysing the 
structure of the GEAR organisation as detailed in the paper 'Glasgow 
East End Project: Working Document on Organisation' which was presented
to the first meeting of the Governing Committee in August 1976.
All of the organisations involved in the project are represented 
on the 'Governing Committee' (in Harris and Scott's terms the 
'Representative body') whose structure may be represented diagrama- 
tically thus,
CHAIRMAN (SCOTTISH OFFICE MINISTER)
I I I I
SDA (2) SSHA (2) SRC (3) GDC (3)
(CHAIRMAN AND 
VICE CHAIRMAN)
The function of this organisation is to 'propose to the responsible 
authorities the development strategy and overall plan and programme 
of action for the area' (section 4: Working document). However, it
remains a non-executive state II multi-organisation (Harris and Scott 
(1974) P»36), the individual participants still 'retain their full 
statutory powers and responsibilities except to the extent that they 
may choose to delegate them' (section 19: Working document). Thus
the 'policy domain' of each organisation is guaranteed from the outset. 
The significance of this can be highlighted with reference to the work 
of Pressman and WildaVsky (l973)» In their Oakland study, they 
suggested that although there may be general agreement on ends, there 
may also be disagreement on means. In the east end project by allowing 
the decision on means to remain largely at the discretion of each 
participating organisation, the role of the governing committee in 
enforcing the implementation of an inter-corporate decision is 
weakened.
It has been revealed to the author that there is some indication 
that tensions between individual participants in the multi-organisation 
are increasing. Of the £120 million that was allocated to the project,
the only 'new resources' committed to the area came through the budgets 
of the SDA and SSHA. The majority of the budget was calculated on 
the basis of the combined capital budget that both the local authorities 
were liable to spend in the area during the duration of the project 
1976-1984* It has been suggested that the Regional Council feel that 
the District Council is receiving more Central Government aid as many 
of its functions are being aided financially by the activities of the 
outside agencies (housing being the most obvious example) whilst the 
Regional Council is receiving no formal financial help with the Edu­
cation and Social Work budgets in the area.
In order to facilitate organisational interaction, the document 
stresses that 'reliance should be placed as much as possible on the 
ordinary day-to-day channels of interchange and communication between 
officials (section 12: Working document) and indeed does suggest
the need for an officer in each organisation to act as reticulist and 
'facilitate a corporate response in relation to the project on the part 
of his authority' (section 11: Working document). However, in the
case of a multi-organisation such as this where organisational inter­
action is mandated, there seems little scope for the fullest expression 
of the reticulist role in the 'network-activating' sense.
The Scottish Development Agency in addition to carrying out its 
usual functions (providing and promoting factory development, commercial 
developments, environmental work and derelict land clearance) provides 
the co-ordinating management of the project (through the chairing of a 
consultative group of senior officials from each of the organisations) 
and prepares the overall proposals and programmes of action for the 
area to be submitted to the governing committee. The concession
of this co-ordinating role to a central government agency seems odd 
in view of the conclusions of the literature on centraUlocal relations 
which highlight the intransigence of both central departments and 
local authorities to concede policy space to each other.
Cox (1978) in an analysis of why urban policy in Britain has 
taken a mainly 'exhortive' form, emphasises the unwillingness of 
local authorities to countenance any serious attempts by central govern­
ment at over-arching coordination of services and functions. Indeed 
Cox goes as far as to suggest that no agency (at central, regional or 
local level) which attempts to look at problems 'in the round' and 
intervene positively is a viable possibility. However, it is suggested 
that the co-ordinating role in the GEAR scheme was allocated to the 
SDA due to the inability of both Regional and District councils to 
concede this co-ordinating role to each other due to their competition 
for policy space. Given the mechanisms to ensure and protect organi­
sational auknomy outlined above, the SDA is in the unenviable situation 
of having few resources with which to manage the situation.
Members of the SDA themselves feel unhappy with the role allocated 
to the agency in the project for a number of specific reasons which 
are essentially manifestations of this general point of 'resource- 
deficiency'. Firstly, being established only six months before the 
GEAR scheme itself was announced, the agency lacked legitimacy in the 
eyes of the other organisations involved in the scheme. Secondly, 
urban renewal is not the prime function of the agency; it is a multi­
functional agency established to,
'... further the economic development of Scotland 
with a special emphasis on providing, maintaining 
and safeguarding employment and improving the 
environment•'
(Directory of Paid Public Appointments 
made by Ministers, p.104)
The urban renewal directorate is merely one ’functional wing1 of this 
organisation.
Thirdly, the SDA is ill-equipped to pursue or co-ordinate physical 
planning policies in the area. Glasgow District Council, as statutory 
authority for local planning, had already proceeded with their prepa­
ration in advance of both the project being announced and the Regional 
Structure Plan being produced. Thus, the Scottish Development Agency, 
with few resources of its own with which to manage the dependencies of 
other organisations, had in turn its dependency increased by its reliance 
on Glasgow District Council for the provision of information and material 
on the local plans.
The results of these organisational interactions are evident in 
the ’Future for GEAR1 public consultation document published in July 
1978, two years after the project was designated. The document details 
a number of coursesof action which can be taken to combat the problems 
identified in the East End but contains no details of whether each is 
1implementable' or indeed the organisational arrangements necessary 
for full implementation. One is tempted to ask whether these have 
been formulated.
Given the tenets of this analysis, what specific recommendations 
can be made to improve the structure of the GEAR organisation? At 
the outset it should be noted that in the haste to establish the project, 
little systematic thought seems to have been given to organisational 
design so that it may be argued that any rational thought is a step 
forward. However, this argument notwithstanding, one might suggest 
that the GEAR organisation should be reconstituted on a 'state III 
multi-organisation' (Harris and Scott (1974) p*36) that is, significant
powers should he delegated to both the 1representative-body1 (the 
Governing committee) and the 'agency' (the consultative group of officials) 
by the participants, which would obviate the need for continual referral 
of proposals back to the participants. This structure would not only 
ensure the commitment of both bodies to the project (as organisational 
survival would be linked to successful completion) but should also give 
a common appreciation of the task which, as Harris and Scott (1974) 
highlight, is of 'paramount importance in the formation and maintenance 
of the multi-organisation' (p.44).
The Passenger Transport Executives
There has been a growing awareness during the last decade of the 
economic, social and environmental implications for urban life of 
complete car orientation. In Britain, successive Conservative and 
Labour Governments have shown themselves reluctant to follow the logical 
implications of urban public transport's lack of success in competing 
with the car. However, as Hov.ell and Jones (1975) highlight through 
a number of policy statements published between 1967 and 1973 > passenger 
transport planning has been subtly shifting emphasis from being reactive 
and regulatory to being more positive and promotional. The objectives 
which were largely those of rationalising (that is reducing) rail and 
bus operations in the major conurbations have altered to those concerned 
with making public transport a more attractive alternative.
Instrumental in promoting this positive approach have been the 
Passenger Transport Executives (PTE's) created under the 1968 Transport 
Act. Anticipating the Local Government reforms implemented (in England 
and Wales) in 1974, the Act established in 1969 four PTE's for the 
conurbations of Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Tyneside and the West
Midlands. Three additional PTE's were created in 1973 and 1974, 
Strathclyde (Greater Glasgow), West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire.
The PTE's together with the much longer established London Transport, 
have as their overriding duty the provision of a properly integrated 
system of road and fixed track public transport capable of attracting 
passengers from private modes of transport through 'improved efficiency 
and c onveni enc e'•
The significance of the PTE's for the present study is two-fold. 
Firstly, they are semi-autonomous agencies, outwith the 'formal' 
control of the Local Authority. However, the policies pursued by the 
PTE's are obviously interrelated to the activities of both central and 
local government and are indeed linked to them by the participation of 
the PTE's in the annual Transport Policies and Programmes funding 
exercise. This opens up the possibility of explaining in practice 
the relationship between a government agency and elected organs of 
government.
Secondly, in pursuing an integrated transport policy, the PTE's 
have obviously to try to ensure the compliance of other public transport 
agencies, British Rail, the National Bus Company and the Scottish 
Transport Group.
At the outset, however, it should be noted that there is disparity 
between the philosophy under which the PTE’s were set up and the 
philosophy of corporate planning discussed above. As Redcliffe- 
Maud stressed the magnitude and complexity of issues in the conur­
bation demand strong and unified control for planning, transportation 
and major development. Part of the reason however for the 'hiving- 
off' of PTE's from local authorities as boards with clearly defined
powers was that they were seen by many as business organisations to 
undertake rationalisation of services and to balance revenues from 
fares, etc. with expenditure. Indeed the 'Morrisonian' origins 
are further confirmed by the PTE’s being required to adopt company 
associating systems, being able to acquire land and being obliged to 
publish annual reports. In many ways the situation resembles that 
of the Nationalised Industries although the PTE's are obviously much 
more restricted where and how they operate. In relation also to the 
scale of their activities the social obligations of the PTE's are 
possibly more intensive given the dependence of deprived inner city 
areas on public transport.
It is evident from statements in the 1968 Transport Act that the
PTE's were designed to serve as focal organisations with which to
manage urban public transport within organisation sets comprising
of the other public transport agencies. Thus the broad obligations
of the PTE's are specified as follows,
'9(3) In the case of each designated Area it shall 
be the general duty ... (b) of the executive so to 
exercise and perform their functions under this part 
of the Act and section 24(2) thereof with respect to 
the provision of a properly integrated and efficient 
system of public passenger transport to meet the 
needs of that Area with due regard to the town planning 
and traffic and parking policies of the councils of const­
ituency areas.'
(Section 9)
Yet this attempt to mandate organisational interaction has failed 
essentially due to the failure to take into account the dynamics of 
an inter-organisational situation. In reality the problems of 
achieving this inter-corporate planning have turned the situation into
an organisational network rather than a structurally managed set. As 
Norton and Spencer (1974) highlight, the separatist traditions of the 
public transport agencies (British Rail, the National Bus Company and 
the Scottish Transport Group which incorporated each of the regional 
bus groups and the ferry operators Caledonian MacBrayne) in the 
local setting stand in the way of aspirations for a rational unified 
approach to transport policy in the large conurbations. Conflict 
arises for two reasons, the overlapping policy fields of each organi­
sation and the lack of statutory power vested in the PTE’s to ensure 
the compliance of transport agencies with their wishes. Indeed there 
is some evidence that the relationship between transport operators 
is at present somewhat strained.
One illustration of this is the ’Section 20' agreement between 
PTE's and British Rail on the provision of commuter rail services under 
the terms of the 1968 Transport Act. Under this arrangement the PTE 
as a body is responsible for determining overall policy on the provision 
of services while British Rail as agent supplies the services (this 
arrangement does not apply in Tyneside). Payment by the PTE's to 
British Rail where services are provided include all the specific 
operating costs,some of the infrastructure costs and underwriting 
incurred operating deficits. It is felt by certain PTE employees 
that this facilitates British Rail 'off-loading' overheads on 'Section 
20' claims in the absence of PTE power to investigate specific day-to- 
day operating figures. Thrower (1978) remarks that the figures ar­
rived at by the Railways Board for services provided are often large 
and would be unpalatable to a metropolitan authority at a time of 
severely restricted finance.
Similar, indeed greater, conflict exists between the PTE's and
both National and Scottish Bus Groups as would be expected since each 
of these organisations pursues the same objectives in the same policy 
space (the PTE's operate metropolitan bus services in their areas).
At the operational level, each organisation could equally well carry 
out the tasks of the other and thus compromises such as the 'boundary 
rule' (whereby restrictions are placed on bus operators picking up 
passengers within the PTE operating area) have been evolved in an 
attempt to delimit policy space and establish 'domain consensus'.
The difficulties of managing situations such as these are com­
pounded by the weaknesses of the planning provisions allocated to the 
PTE's with which to manage the dependencies of other agencies. Hov.ell 
and Jones' (1975) research indicates that in all cases, the bulk of 
managerial planning effort in the PTE's has been directed to the 
publication of a Transport Plan intended to prescribe a detailed 
infrastructure network in accordance with the demands of the Transport 
Act 1968 (Section 18(2)). Although this has been recently superseded 
by legislation on Transport Policy which obliges top-tier authorities 
in England and Wales to produce public passenger transport plans, it is 
worth focussing on the experiences under the 1968 Act as a guide to what 
may happen in the future. As Hovell and Jones (1975) highlight,
PTE's do not seem to have seized the initiative and stated with sufficient 
cogency what, in their opinion, the future pattern of public transport 
ought to be, a response which seems conditioned by the recognition by 
the PTE's of the problems of 'interfering' in other agencies policy 
fields. Indeed, the maintenance of existing 'modal-split' (the term 
used to define the proportions of passengers travelling by the various 
transport modes, for example by car, bus and rail) has become an end 
in itself for Tyneside PTE who wish it maintained until the end of the
decade. Yet as the 1977 White Paper on Transport Policy (Cmnd 6836) 
suggested,’modal-split' can act as a barrier to an integrated transport 
policy,
'the issue ... is not so much a question of 
fairness between one mode of transport and another, 
but rather how much we can and should spend as a 
nation on supporting public transport ••. and how that 
support can be used most effectively.*
(para 53)
The weakness of the PTE's as organisations with which to co­
ordinate the activities of government transport agencies is further 
compounded by the close relationship which the PTE's enjoy with the 
local authority of the area in which they act. The PTE's are respon­
sible to the local authority as Passenger Transport Authority (PTA) 
for the area with a controlling and policy-watching brief which is 
generally exercised through the Highways and Transportation Committee 
of the authority. Although this has the beneficial effect of re­
integrating discussion of public transport with that of Roads and 
Highways, it leads to some suspicion on the part of transport agencies 
that their organisational autonomy is being threatened in effect by 
the Local Authority. Thus the transport agencies prefer a direct 
input into the annual Transport Policies and Programmes (TPP's) 
funding exercise and the possibilities for developing an integrated 
set of public transport policies are reduced.
Using this analysis, what improvements can one suggest in the 
management of urban public transport by the PTE's? Obviously more 
consideration should have been given to detailing the processes by 
which the PTE’s were to achieve the objectives hoped for in the 1968 
Transport Act. Clearly the PTE's have few resources with which to 
manage the situation and there is little interdependence between the
transport agencies. If a totally comprehensive approach to urban 
public transport is desired by Central Government, direct executive 
powers should be delegated to the PTE’s in order to ensure the compli­
ance of other agencies. One might speculate what particular forms 
these might take. Perhaps an element of the agencies grant funding 
from either central government or the local authority could be used to 
structure the activities of these agencies (although the experience 
of Greater Glasgow PTE would suggest that this is fairly unsuccessful) 
or the PTE’s planning powers could be developed and strengthened.
What is certain, however, is that such changes will need to be made* 
Although creditable efforts have been made organisationally to protect 
future public transport provision, it is time now for their re-examination 
in the light of experience to ensure a continuing positive role for 
public transport in the major cities of Britain*
The Regional Reports
The Regional Reports are a feature unique to the Scottish Local 
Government System stemming from a recognition in the Scottish Office 
of the need for a corporate policy framework to be established in each 
region soon after the re-organisation of local government in May 1975* 
However, as McDonald (1977) has highlighted, -their origins are somewhat 
mysterious although interestingly, the ’Sunderland Study1 (sponsored 
by the Department of the Environment) in preparation at the same time 
recommended a management procedure based on a Community Review, a 
'state of the community' report from which statements of problems and 
priorities would be derived*
When the new Regional and Islands Councils took office and 
assumed responsibilities, one of the first tasks facing them was the 
preparation of Regional Reports under the statutory obligations of the 
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1^ 73 (sec tim 173X Further broad guidance 
on form and content was given to local authorities by the Scottish 
Development Department in Circular 4/75* In this circular the main 
purposes of the Report were seen in largely physical planning terms, 
it being suggested that the Reports should be used to review inherited 
development plans and investment commitments; to set out a strategy 
for preparing Structure and Local Plans; and to indicate priority areas 
for future investment. Thus although it is not a document which 
originated under planning legislation, its central concerns were very 
much those of Regional Council Physical Planning departments. More 
significantly for the present study, however, the circular also stressed 
the importance of involving other government agencies as appropriate.
It was thus hoped that such inter-agency consultation offered the 
possibility that the Reports would be able to undertake an extremely 
wide-ranging review of problems faced in particular Regions extending 
well beyond those areas which the Regional or Island Councils them­
selves have full executive power. Although these sentiments were 
echoed by the Secretary of State in his formal Observations on the first 
Reports, he did seek to establish some sort of 'domain consensus’ 
on organisational policy by warning that while it was appropriate 
for Regional or Islands Councils to draw the attention of other authori­
ties and agencies to issues of common concern, each had its own legiti­
mate interest and statutory responsibilities and these must be respected.
As Friend, Lind and McDonald (1978) highlighted, the concept of 
the Regional Report as both a corporate and an inter-corporate document 
emphasises the procedural recognition by Central Government that there 
are many key policy decisions which cannot be regarded as falling 
clearly within the sole discretion of particular organisations*
Rather, they are to be regarded as matters of negotiation both between 
one level of government and another and between local authorities and 
government agencies through channels which encourage a more public and 
carefully argued justification of the positions adopted by each parti­
cipant organisation. It is also clear that this concept of the 
Regional Report as expressed by Lyddon (1974), and SDD circular 4/75 
views it as a management tool for the 'focal organisation', the Regional 
Council. Friend et al (1978) suggest that this choice of management 
design is justified as Regional Councils are influential not only 
through the wide range of functional responsibilities they have but 
also through their status as elected bodies directly accountable in 
electoral and financial terms to the population of their area*
Further, they argue that this open accountability and the interest of 
elected members in the social and economic welfare of the area give 
the Regional Councils a clear inter-corporate concern with the 
activities of government agencies which comprise the 'organisation 
set' of the Regional Councils. With this interpretation borne in 
mind, attention can now be turned to looking at the techniques which 
Regional Councils can use in involving government agencies in the 
policy formulation of the Regional Report*
Surprisingly, given the volume of literature published on the 
first round of what was, in effect, only twelve reports (for a selection 
see McDonald (1977), Brown (1977) and Howat and Wilkinson (1977)),
inter-organisational relations have been touched on only tangentially.
It must be stated at the outset that within the broad guidelines set 
by Central Government, there were certain differences in interpreta­
tion by different authorities. Although the Secretary of State had 
asked authorities to include a summary statement within a standard 
format which was designed to highlight the stated priorities and show 
both the resource implications of the policies adopted and the range 
of agencies which might be associated with the authority in implementation, 
most reports were developed at a coarser level of detail than was implied 
by the format as McDonald (1977) has shown. This perhaps reflects 
the differing conceptions of the reports held by different authorities. 
Strathclyde Regional Council# as Boyle (1978) highlights, viewed the 
document very much as an inter-corporate policy tool whereas Central 
Regional Council used the Regional Report intra-corporately as a means 
to developing corporate working within the authority.
In seeking statements from government agencies on their percep­
tions of their roles, objectives and policies within the Region, Fife 
Regional Council found that most had some difficulty in producing the 
statements and indeed the statements which were produced often provided 
little policy information (Fife Regional Report 1976, section A1 - 
introduction, para 1.8). However, when one compares the experiences 
of inter-agency involvement in the Gwent Structure Plan which Garvie 
(1977) documents, such organisational defensiveness should have been 
expected. The process of involving other agencies in the Gwent case 
was initiated through the publication of an Issues Report, Discussion 
Papers, Technical Notes and finally an Alternatives Report in decreasing 
level of abstraction. Garvie suggests that the process was fairly
unsuccessful in the initial phase of agency reaction to the Issues 
Report which provided a summary of the main problems facing the county. 
At this point, the quality of response from government agencies was 
more explanatory of their own responsibilities and viewpoints rather 
than being a critical response to the issues raised. More positive 
contributions were made by agencies in the latter, more concrete, 
policy option choice phases where the effects on agency action was 
most obvious. As this appears to have been perceived as a threat to 
organisational autonomy through the reduction of agency discretion, 
many more comments were received. Given that such defensiveness will 
always be a feature of the production of any inter-corporate document, 
the form of any future Regional Reports will need to be devised in 
such a way as to contend with this.
Friend et al (1978) suggest that future Regional Reports should 
be trichotomous in form with sections again moving from the general 
to the more specific levels. The first section they envisage as 
focussing on the key strategic concerns of the Regional Council; 
the second, they see as presenting a conspectus of the most significant 
policies of the Regional Council and the third, they view as proposing 
an agenda of priorities for further exploration and action. Sections 
One and Two,they suggest, should be largely intra-corporate, the first 
and principal section presenting a picture of a limited range of 
strategic concerns or key issues which the Regional Council intends to 
pursue over the next few years and the second pursuing the implications 
of these concerns in terms of adaptations to a Regional Council's 
policies which relate to its own fields of executive responsibility. 
Inter-corporate involvement is developed in the third, most specific 
section which is intended to allow the Regional Council to explore the
possibilities for adjustment in the policy positions of any bodies 
which may help in addressing the key strategic concerns expressed in 
the Regional Report*
Clearly this formulation, if adopted in any future round of 
Regional Reports requested by the Secretary of State, would seem to 
avoid many of the disadvantages that Garvie*s experiences in Gwent 
revealed. However one might suggest that fuller use could be made 
of the Regional Report. McDonald (1977) in her early review of the 
Regional Reports system, expressed the hope that Financial Planning 
would be a constructive supplement to them. Tayside Region in 
developing this, have introduced a new section to their Regional Report 
(which they decided to update annually) which relates capital expen­
diture proposals to policy objectives in the Report. If some means 
can be found to commit government agencies to stating their proposed 
policies and expenditure implications through a combined Regional 
Report/Financial Plan system it will have fulfilled its potential as 
a truly inter-corporate document. That this might be perceived by 
Central Government as giving Local Authorities too much power is 
beyond doubt. However, it affords an opportunity for the development 
of a plan of unrivalled comprehensiveness. We may only need to wait 
for the next fiscal crisis for its value to be realised.
What general themes can one thus extract from these case examples? 
Clearly they are both very short and selective and much future research 
needs to be done from this perspective, but, with this qualification 
in mind, they do seem to raise a number of points.
Firstly, there seems to have been little thought given at the 
organisational design stage, to considering the likely pattern of 
organisational interaction and the implications of this for policy­
making. This is reflected in the powers given (or indeed not given) 
to the 'focal organisation' with which to structure the situation.
Secondly, this failure at the organisational design stage has 
made the situation difficult, if not impossible, to manage. Con­
sideration of the examples of the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme 
and the Passenger Transport Executives has shown the wide divergence 
between the policy objectives intended and the results actually achieved.
The desire by organisations to preserve their 'domain' outweighs 
the ability of one organisation with few resources or powers to manage 
their activities. Clearly, future attempts at inter-corporate planning 
through perhaps future Regional Reports should include some powers 
on the part of one organisation to manage others.
Thirdly, consideration of the GEAR scheme shows the weakness of 
the reticulist concept in mandated organisational interaction situations.
The concept as devised originally by Friend and Power had the dynamic 
aspect of the opening and closing of links between organisations which 
is not possible where organisational interaction is highly structured. 
Further, as Faludi (1973a) has suggested, there is little point in 
attempting positive co-ordination unless individual planning agencies 
surrender part of their autonomy and vest it in the strategic planning 
agency. Reticulism in aiding partisan mutual adjustment may not lead 
to a positive approach in planning.
Finally, in focussing only on organisational links, one must 
beware of restricting the policy focus unnecessarily. Inter-organisational
links are only one aspect of policy-making. They may, for example, 
explain much of the inactivity in the East End of Glasgow but would 
not, of course, in themselves explain something like Inner-City 
policies as a whole. It is not claimed that such links are the most 
important influence on policy, only that they are important for some 
policies. The over-emphasis on these links in this work is a deli­
berate over-compensation for a lack of emphasis in the past.
CHAPTER 5 - 'URBAN MANAGERIALISM RECONSIDERED' - 
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In a complex society such as our own, it is evident a wide range 
of tasks exists which can only be carried out through joint working 
relationships amongst organisations. As has been seen above, this 
is particularly true of urban policy making where separate government 
agencies provide public services closely related to the activities of 
local authorities. Following from this, the thrust of the arguments 
in the previous chapters suggests that given the dysfunctional conse­
quences of public agencies pursuing functional tasks independently of 
each other, much attention needs to be paid to the structuring of 
such situations either through the processes of more conscious 
organisational design of multiple organisation policy relationships, 
of through the development of management techniques with which to co­
ordinate such situations. It is the contention of this final chapter 
that these tasks are more properly the concern of the strategic or 
policy planner working in the upper tier of local government and that 
this change in role definition must be reflected in changes in planning 
education.
The role definition of the task of town planners has undergone 
much analysis and discussion in the turbulent planning environment of 
the past fifteen years. Changes in practice following the develop­
ment of public participation, the separation of strategic and local 
planning, the re-organisation of local government and the internal 
changes in management structures have precipitated an ongoing debate 
on what should be the functions and concerns of planning as a profession.
If there is a common thread in all of these changes, it is surely a 
general change in the conception of the role of planners from being 
'negative1 in the sense of constraining and restricting development 
through development control procedures, to being more 'positive' and 
promotional in developing the ideas of both local population and 
elected councillors and translating them into implementable policies.
Given the associated controversies surrounding this change, there 
is a surprising similarity in the techniques used by planners in both 
the negative and positive situations. The more conventional land use 
and development proposals by planners for example, usually entail 
interaction with Valuers and Treasurers over site purchase, Solicitors 
over legal matters, Housing Officials in relation to public housing, 
Technical Officers and Architects over building requirements, Highway 
Engineers concerning roads, etc. etc. Corporate planning as a general 
management process similarly involves the negotiations between local 
authority functional departments. Since policy planners lack direct 
or positive powers and rarely determine resource allocation, they are 
largely reliant on influence (through bargaining and exchange, usually 
on the basis of information control) and constructing a chain of 
commitment between networks of officials. Thus planning on this level 
ceases to be the exclusive concern of individual departments and 
now attends to linkages between the areas of concern between existing 
departments. The intra-corporate similarity with Friend et al's (1974) 
notion of inter-corporate links is clear.
As Faludi (1976) has highlighted, a concomitant change is the 
orientation of planning towards some form of overall guidance of all
the activities of government, a change reflected in the Royal Town
Planning Institute's debates over educational policy. Eddison (1968)
and Stewart (1969) structured the discussion initially with their
interpretations of the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act which suggested
the need for urban management processes, a point echoed by Amos (1969)
in his discussion of the 'general planning function'. This was
followed by the Centre for Environmental Studies publishing three
studies (Cockburn, 1970a, b and c) and assembling a working party on
objectives for planning education (Progress in Planning, 1973) with a
clear commitment to a broad concept of planning. Indeed they take
Urban and Regional Planning to mean 'the planning processes within and
linking all agencies making policies and taking decisions about the
city' (p.10) although they fail to operationalise this concept and
acknowledge the lack of research in this 'meta-planning' field.
However, perhaps the most positive statement of this approach was that
by Amos in his presidential address of 1971,
'... the Institute's current posture concentrates 
attention upon the application of the planning 
process to physical planning at various scales to 
the exclusion of direct applications of the process 
to social and economic phenomena and to the neglect 
of management planning of coincident physical, 
social and economic factors.'
(quoted by Faludi (1976) p.124)
Given the development of Structure Plans, Regional Reports and the 
intellectual hegemony of corporate planning as the dominant local authority 
management technique, clearly there is less exclusion of such socio­
economic factors in 1979 than in 1971. However, although the need 
for the incorporation of socio-economic factors may have been 
accepted, the processual aspects of management outwith the corporate 
realm are still poorly researched. With the growth of government
agencies as an administrative form, to achieve the aims and objectives 
that authors such as Eddison, Stewart and Amos obviously hoped for, 
new interest has to be awakened in inter-corporate public sector 
management techniques.
The discussion of this subject has however been made more difficult 
by the work of Pahl who in the early 1970s published a model of the 
'Urban System' based on the activities of urban managers and proceeded 
not only to structure, but also to stigmatise,the subject area. Given 
the importance of Pahl's work, it seems fruitful to consider it in 
slightly more detail in relation to the topic under consideration.
Pahl (1970) develops his model from a criticism of Rex and Moore's 
(1967) model of housing classes which Pahl suggests presents a consumers' 
model of housing. This he criticises for failing to take account of 
the bureaucratic rules and procedures which structure the allocation 
of housing and indeed the other services and facilities of the urban 
system. From this it is a short Weberian step for Pahl to argue that 
in discussing the distribution of resources in the urban system, one 
needs to focus on bureaucratic gatekeepers', housing managers, local 
government officers, representatives of building societies, social workers, 
estate agents, etc., as these 'managers' of the urban system provide 
the independent variables of the subject.
In stressing the 'allocative' functions of these managers, however, 
Pahl leaves himself open to criticism on two broad points. Firstly, 
accusations have been made that he gives these managers too much autonomy 
and independence and in so doing, fails to view them as managers on
behalf of other (non-defined) interests. This criticism is 
particularly cogent as he includes both public officials and private 
company employees in his somewhat broad definition of managers. 
Secondly, critics have suggested that the term 'urban system' as used 
by Pahl becomes much more than a mere short-hand to emphasise a 
particular focus on a particular aspect of life or a particular set 
of services and facilities. Pahl begins to see the urban system as a 
system in the full sense of the term as used by Easton (1965), that is, 
a self-contained bounded system with its own internal logic.
In the face of these criticisms, Pahl (1975) admitted the
limitations of the work and retracted many of his earlier statements.
However, although the debate has served to show the limitations of
viewing managers as 'authoritative allocators*, the discussion takes
for granted a unitary conception of urban managers based on the
allocative dimension of their tasks. As Kaufman (1968) highlights,
the scope of management is much broader,
'... the function of administration is to 'carry-out' 
or 'execute' or 'implement' policy decisions, or to 
co-ordinate activity in order to accomplish some common 
purpose, or simply to achieve co-operation in the 
pursuit of a shared goal.'
(p.61)
Thus the managerialist debate by focussing exclusively on the 
'allocative' dimension of management tasks, fails to take into account 
the wider 'co-ordinative' dimension of the management role. This 
distinction is crucial to the understanding of the Local Authority 
Planners role. Although the activities of planners have significant 
redistributive aspects (as Hall et al (l973>) have highlighted) their 
major managerial activity concerns the structuring of the activities of
groups and organisations within the local authority area. Clearly
this broad interpretation is also used by Eddison (1972),
’Management ... is not concerned simply with 
an organisation in the abstract. It is 
concerned with the organisation in its 
environment•1
(p.117)
although in further discussion Eddison comes close to the ’authori­
tative allocator' view of Pahl. As has been argued above, organisational 
environment is largely comprised of other organisations and thus an 
understanding of the literature on inter-organisational relations is 
crucial in evolving management skills to organise the full range of 
governmental activities in the local area. Clearly, if one is to 
achieve this responsive and effective 'urban governance' there is, 
as the Centre for Environmental Studies suggest, the 'urgent need for 
a new appreciation of the purpose, structure and scope of planning 
education'. Thus it is to a consideration of how inter-organisational 
analysis should be incorporated into planning education that attention 
is now turned.
Following Bernstein (l97l), Faludi (1976) presents two concepts 
of how planning schools' curricula may be organised: the 'integrated'
code and the 'collection' code. The first refers to a curriculum 
where previously isolated subjects or courses have been subordinated 
to some relational idea which blows the boundaries between subjects, 
whereas the collection curriculum consists of a series of bounded and 
isolated subjects. Faludi views the integrated code as preferable 
for planning education and proposes that 'planning theory' should be
the disciplinary core around which integration should occur in 
planning education. From this position Faludi examines the role of 
Sociology in his ideal planning curriculum. A key difficulty that he 
identifies is that Sociologists put emphasis upon the distinctiveness 
of their discipline, an emphasis that runs counter to the integrated 
code.
Faludi raises a number of important and indeed contentious points 
in his paper but given the focus of the present study, it is proposed 
to focus only on the principal concern of the paper, the relationship 
between sociology and the core of the ideal curriculum 'planning theory'. 
As Cooke and Rees (1977) highlight, this relationship is never specified. 
Faludi suggests in a somewhat contradictory fashion that,
'sociology (as indeed the other social sciences) 
makes essential contributions to both planning 
theory and to our understanding of the problems 
in hand.'
(1976, p.129)
but also that,
'Sociology and the other social sciences, their 
potential notwithstanding, have failed to provide 
an adequate disciplinary base for those concerned 
with intervention in the real world.'
(1976, p.121)
Clearly as Cooke and Rees (l97l) comment, one is led to a direct
examination of Faludi's conception of 'planning theory' itself to 
discover why sociology and the other social sciences fail to provide 
the adequate disciplinary base.
Faludi's most succinct statements on the subject were published 
in 1973 (a and b). There he distinguishes between two types of possible
’planning theory1:- procedural (that is, 'theory of planning') and 
substantive (that is 'theory in planning’), the division being based 
upon what are regarded as two different types of problem faced by 
planners. The first type of problem defines the object of 'theories 
in planning'. These are problems of planners' 'areas of concern'. 
However Faludi is somewhat imprecise about the objects that are the 
concern of planners and consequently offers only the vague definition 
as being whatever planners conceive to be their raw material, 'the 
land-use system or people'. The second type of problem defines the 
object of 'theory of planning'. These are the problems which relate 
to 'the planner himself, the agencies in which he operates, and the 
procedures which he adopts' (Faludi, 1973a> P*5). Faludi argues 
that these problems are more basic and more general and he wishes to 
reserve the designation of 'planning theory' for this 'theory of 
planning'• Thus the object of planning theory proper is the practice 
of planning agencies and the aim of planning theory is to improve this 
practice (although it must be emphasised to avoid confusion that he 
defines planning agencies as planning organisations and thus does not 
mean merely government agencies).
The weakness of the distinction is usefully highlighted when one 
considers the position of inter-organisational sociology in Faludi's 
scheme. The attempt to understand human behaviour by means of the 
systematic application of some form of rational and logical methodology 
is pervasive throughout the whole of social scientific enquiry; it 
is characteristic of both 'theory in planning' (for example location 
theory and organisation theory to explain the behaviour of pressure 
groups, etc.) and ’(theory of planning' (where sociological analysis of 
inter-organisational relations is obviously crucial in understanding the
interactions between organisations and their consequences for policy­
making). The point raised here is not whether 'substantive theory' 
is pre-eminent over 'procedural theory1 or vice versa in any absolute 
sense. What is being questioned is the utility of the distinction 
in the present context and the way in which Faludi uses the distinction 
to differentiate sociology from planning theory.
McCallum (1974) takes a different approach to the subject by 
attempting to focus on the 'intrinsic nature' of planning in order to 
more fully relate it to planning theory. Having characterised planning 
as societal action which is one expression of a wider generic activity 
but whose institutionalised interest is principally urban phenomena, 
McCallum suggests that these three salient features give rise to three 
different sets of planning theories; theories of society, theories of 
the generic planning process and theories of urban and regional 
phenomena. As can be seen from the discussion of Faludi's work above, 
this approach replicates the distinction between procedural and sub­
stantive theories and as such, is open to the criticisms made of Faludi 
(although McCallum to his credit does stress that these theories are 
inter-related but does not specify further how they are related).
However, McCallum (1974) takes the argument one step further by 
suggesting that the fundamental reason for this trichotomy in planning 
theory is that most of the subjects currently of intellectual interest 
in planning have been organised around the traditional established 
disciplines, a structure which is clearly unsuitable for planning 
purposes which require these subjects to be looked at in a broader 
context and approached from new perspectives. Indeed, as he states,
'... this is an aspect of planning, and of planning 
theory, which requires a great deal of attention and 
work in order to free subjects from their disciplinary 
bounds and rework them to fit the needs of planning.1
(p.739)
With inter-organisational theory, this 're-working1 is liable to be 
somewhat easier. As Pfeffer and Salahcik (1978) highlight, inter- 
organisational theory is divorced from the narrower private sector 
management concerns with efficiency, motivation and leadership which 
characterise much intra-organisation theory. Indeed the lack of 
research in inter-organisation theory reflects its perceived irrele­
vance to any professional group. However, it is the contention of 
this study that it is integral to comprehensive planning in the public 
sector. The question thus becomes how one can integrate this body of 
thought into the curricula of planning schools.
The underlying logic of present Royal Town Planning Institute 
guidelines for education is reminiscent of the 'generalist-with-a- 
specialism' idea which Perloff developed in 1957* The 1973 Discussion 
Paper on Educational Policy(RTPI, 1973) translated this into a modular 
approach to curriculum design combining 'foundation' and 'applied' 
courses, which subsequently became official policy in 1974* Thus 
current educational policy sees three fields of study as being essential 
elements of any recognised course:- field A - knowledge and under­
standing of the nature and state of the environment and the effect and 
potential of environmental planning, field B - the development and 
perception of attitudes and values, both from a student's viewpoint 
and to ensure that he is aware of other people's perspectives, and 
field C - the development of skills and practical competence for plan- 
making and implementation. In addition, the major integrating focus 
of the course is seen as its concern for the 'physical environment in 
relation to the needs of society'.
There are three particular criticisms of these guidelines which 
the Education Board in its recent policy review (RTPI, 1979) recognised 
as being particularly cogent. Firstly, the combination of specific 
requirements and general propositions had proved difficult to maintain 
in practice. Secondly, Visiting Boards had found difficulty in 
applying the guidelines consistently when seeking to validate courses, 
and finally, the degree of flexibility intended by the Guidelines was 
unclear, making it somewhat difficult to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Interestingly, these problems have become apparent at a time when 
conceptions of 'planning' are widening dramatically and indeed when 
graduates with a formal planning education are finding employment in 
other fields as the generic quality of their skills is being more 
widely recognised. Thus the Education Board of the Institute has 
recently decided that there is a strong case for change in education 
practice and has circulated a discussion document in which two basic 
alternating approaches are suggested.
The first approach - the 'characteristics' approach, is based 
upon the proposition that planners require certain basic abilities, 
skills and areas of knowledge which the Institute should define in 
general terms and which schools should then develop as part of an 
integrated course in whatever way they see fit.
The second approach - the 'core' approach is based upon the 
proposition that the Institute should define as precisely as is possible 
a compulsory 'core' of planning education, leaving schools relatively 
free to develop courses as they wish around this 'core' provided that 
the context for courses remains identifiably and directly relevant to 
environmental planning.
Although these summaries are somewhat crude, they serve to 
highlight that the ’characteristics' approach is essentially that being 
used at present and its adoption would not represent a significant 
advance in educational policy (although the Visiting Board would not 
be asked to evaluate 'output' directly as at present). Thus the 
'core' approach would seem to offer some prospect of advance in educational 
thinking and indeed it can be argued that it incorporates the 
'characteristics' approach as basic abilities and skills stem largely 
from course curricula. It is the contention of this study that inter- 
organisational analysis can provide a useful contribution to planning 
as a 'core' subject and indeed is necessary if the notions of 'urban 
governance' are to be developed further. As Zetter highlighted in 
1973,
'In the debate on the changing nature of urban 
administration, this standpoint (that of the CES 
working group) is, at present, unique - it will 
probably be widely held at the end of the decade.'
(p.417)
One wonders how much longer we need wait for this to be realised.
(approx. 24,000 words)
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